September 17, 2026

# *FDLP Academy Presentation Oversight.gov Resources on U.S. Government Policy Making*

Professor Bert Chapman
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PURDUE UNIVERSITY
Libraries and School of Information Studies

# Oversight.gov

**Current version of website launched in 2017**



# Historical Background on Presenter Interest in This Topic (*Government Information Quarterly* 9 (1)(1992)

Research article • Full text access

Inspector general reports as instruments of governmental accountability

Thelma Freides

Pages 53-64

View PDF Article preview

Research article • Full text access

Access to government information

Kenneth B. Allen

Pages 67-80

View PDF Article preview

Research article • Full text access

Willing to provide but unable to support: The dilemma of smaller depositories in an electronic era

Bert Chapman

Pages 81-87

View PDF

**My first peer-reviewed scholarly publication!**

# Historical Background on U.S. Govt. IG’s

- Public Law 95-452 1978 Inspector General Act. Current legal authority 5 USC 401 et. seq.
- Administrative authority derives from sections of CFR for particular agencies e.g. 10 CFR 1.12 for Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
- Authorizes establishments of Offices of Inspector General in Agriculture, Commerce, EPA, and other departments.
- IG’s are presidentially appointed based on ability and integrity, subject to Senate confirmation, and under jurisdiction of agency leadership.
- Agency head cannot prevent their IG from initiating, carrying out, or issuing subpoenas for audits and investigation.
- President may remove an IG appointee, but must communicate reasons to both congressional houses. Half of these appointees are presidential and half by agency head.
- IG appointees subject to Hatch Act requirements prohibiting engaging in partisan politics.

# January 27, 2025 CRS report documenting presidential removals of agency IG's

Congressional Research Service
Informing the legislative debate since 1914

IN FOCUS

Updated January 27, 2025

## Removal of Inspectors General: Rules, Practice, and Considerations for Congress

In 1978, Congress passed the Inspector General Act (IG Act; P.L. 95-452) with the intent to improve oversight within certain executive branch agencies. During the floor debate on the legislation, Senator Thomas Eagleton described independence as the "most important" characteristic of the inspectors general (*Congressional Record*, vol. 124, part 29, October 22, 1978, p. 30952). While this independence has been considered essential, it is also weighed against the fact that inspectors general (IGs) are part of the agencies and that their dual mission is to report to both agency leaders and Congress.

The removal procedures for IGs fall between removal without limitations and removal only for cause and have been considered an integral element of IG independence since 1978. Nonetheless, Presidents have removed IGs, creating concerns in Congress and with the public regarding the independence of IGs, which have led to both oversight of and changes to statutory removal requirements.

This In Focus provides an overview of the current removal procedure for IGs, identifies past presidential removals, and discusses potential issues for Congress.

Further, in most cases, the President must provide Congress with written notice 15 days before placing an IG on non-duty status and cannot do so at all during the 30-day notice period before removal of an IG without a specific finding that the IG poses a potential threat to employees or the interest of the government.

Additional protection for ongoing investigations is provided by a requirement that when an IG is removed or placed on non-duty status, the acting IG must report to Congress within 15 days on the office's projects at the time the IG was removed (5 U.S.C. 405(f)).

When an IG position is vacant, the "first assistant" is the designated acting IG. The President may appoint another official working in an IG office to serve as an acting IG instead. Such a change also requires 30-day advance notice to Congress including a substantive rationale for the action.

### Removal Practice

There are several examples of Presidents removing IGs. Across these actions, Congress has objected that the removals have the potential to undermine the actual and

**Done by Reagan, Trump 45, Obama, & Biden.**

# Historical Background

- Additional IG’s have been added since then for various departments including intelligence community agencies.
- Role of federal IGs is to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse relating to their agency’s programs and operations, and to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the agency’s operations and programs.
- IG’s can issue criminal penalties if fraud is committed in agency programs by employees, private sector contractors, or grant recipients.
- They issue fact-filled reports based on professional audit, investigative, and inspection standards.
- They provide technical advice as new plans are developed.

# Additional Details

- They can perform independent investigations of allegations.
- Maintain hotlines for employees and others to report confidential information regarding fraud and abuse allegations.
- IG's must report any unreasonable refusal within an agency to provide information to the agency head, or suspected violations of criminal law to the Attorney General
- Types of IG reporting:
- Immediate correspondence to agency head to report egregious or flagrant abuse to Congress. Agency head must transmit this to Congress, with comments, within 6 days.
- Audit, investigative, or inspection/evaluation reports preferred according to professional standards.
- Semiannual reports to Congress describing agency work.

# Examples of individual agency IG website

**Office of Inspector General's Partnership With the Office of the Kentucky State Auditor of Public Accounts: State Auditor's Report How Kentucky Failed to Prevent Over $800 Million of Medicaid Waste**

Issued on 11/07/2025 | Posted on 11/10/2025 | Report number: A-09-23-02005

This memo transmits to the Center for Medicaid and CHIP Services the findings of the Office of the Kentucky State Auditor of Public Accounts: State Auditor's Report How Kentucky Failed to Prevent Over $800 Million of Medicaid Waste, issued September 17, 2025. APA is responsible for the attached audit report and the conclusions expressed in it. We are not expressing an opinion on the report or its results.

# Letter to CMS Official

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

November 7, 2025

**TO:** Daniel Brillman
Deputy Administrator and Director
Center for Medicaid and CHIP Services

**FROM:** John D. Hagg /S/
Acting Deputy Inspector General for Audit Services

**SUBJECT:** Office of Inspector General's Partnership With the Office of the Kentucky State Auditor of Public Accounts: State Auditor's Report *How Kentucky Failed to Prevent Over $800 Million of Medicaid Waste* (A-09-23-02005)

This memo transmits the findings of the Office of the Kentucky State Auditor of Public Accounts' (APA's) special examination report *How Kentucky Failed to Prevent Over $800 Million of Medicaid Waste*, issued September 17, 2025. The APA conducts audits of accounts and financial transactions of all spending agencies of Kentucky. The APA's mission is to help reduce waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement and ensure that public resources are protected, accurately valued, properly accounted for, and effectively employed to improve the quality of life for all Kentuckians. This examination was conducted as part of APA's oversight of Kentucky's Medicaid program.

The objective of APA's special examination was to determine whether Kentucky Medicaid made capitation payments on behalf of beneficiaries who were enrolled in Medicaid (i.e., enrollees) in more than one State during the examination period, based on a random sample and additional review of certain subgroups (e.g., deceased enrollees).

As part of the Office of Inspector General's (OIG's) efforts to partner with State auditors and expand oversight coverage of the Medicaid program, OIG assisted APA with its audit by:

- matching Medicaid claims from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS's) Transformed Medicaid Statistical Information System (T-MSIS) to identify capitated payments that Kentucky made on behalf of enrollees for whom another State also made capitated payments for the same enrollees in the same months,

# Lttr. Table of Contents

# What the Data showed

## CHAPTER 5: What the Data Showed

### Concurrent Capitation Payments

The issue of concurrent capitation payments across state lines is not simply a theoretical problem. It is a real issue with real effects. Auditors gained insight into the extent of those effects by utilizing T-MSIS data from HHS's OIG. Recall that this data is maintained by CMS and contains critically important information from all 50 states, Washington, D.C., and all U.S. territories on eligibility, enrollment, and claims data for Medicaid beneficiaries.[2]

Analysis of the full set of T-MSIS data revealed that Kentucky paid MCOs $836,364,425 in capitation payments for concurrently enrolled individuals over a four-year period. Figure 4 shows Kentucky's concurrent capitation payments for calendar years 2019 to 2022.

**Figure 4: Kentucky's Capitation Payments for Concurrently Enrolled Individuals by Calendar Year**




Source: APA, based on information provided by HHS's OIG.

As can be seen, Kentucky's capitation payments for concurrently enrolled individuals during calendar years 2019 to 2022 increased each year. As discussed above, had Kentucky's executive-branch leaders taken an interest in the issue of capitation payments being concurrently issued for the same individual across state lines, residency questions could have been answered, and

# DMS is the Department of Medicaid Services within the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services

## Explanation

APA made two recommendations to DMS, multiple recommendations specifically to the DMS executive branch leadership, and one recommendation to CHFS.

APA recommended that DMS:

- work with current MCOs to amend relevant contracts to specifically require reports to be shared and processes to be undertaken to detect and reduce the amount of concurrent capitation payments made to MCOs by multiple States for the same enrollee and

- communicate with the Federal Government about: (1) obtaining greater access to T-MSIS data, (2) creating a process to monitor data and alert States about concurrent enrollment, or (3) modify the PARIS system to allow Kentucky to more efficiently identify concurrent enrollment.

APA made multiple recommendations to DMS executive branch leadership, including the following:

- offer detailed instructions addressing all aspects of completing PARIS match tasks and make training resources readily available to all Kentucky Medicaid caseworkers,

- consider adding certain steps for caseworkers during the initial enrollment and recertification process that could help curb concurrent capitation payment waste, and

- provide guidance to caseworkers on the referral process for confirmed cases of concurrent capitation payments across State lines.

# Search for illegal aliens.

## Filtered by

"illegal aliens" X

Reset

| Report Date | Agency Reviewed / Investigated | Report Title | Type | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 05/22/2025 | Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation | DOJ Press Release: Former Exec at O.C. Company and Illegal Alien Arrested on Federal Complaint Alleging He Embezzled $7 Million from His Employer | Investigation | Agency-Wide | View Report → |

View Report Highlights

Press Release

# Former Exec at O.C. Company and Illegal Alien Arrested on Federal Complaint Alleging He Embezzled $7 Million from His Employer

May 22, 2025

*SANTA ANA, California* – A former executive at a Newport Beach company that specializes in the purchase of classic cars – who also happens to be an illegal alien from Mexico – was arrested today on a federal complaint alleging he embezzled approximately $7 million from his employer.

Alexander G. Ramos, 62, of Newport Beach, is charged with wire fraud, a felony that carries a statutory maximum sentence of 20 years in federal prison.

A federal magistrate judge ordered Ramos jailed without bond and scheduled an arraignment for June 30.

According to an affidavit filed with the complaint, Ramos was employed at the victim company since 2017 until his termination in September 2024 in the company's Risk Management Department. Through his positions, he knew his employer's loans and held relationships with title agents or other partners nationwide. He also oversaw requests by the company's Title and Risk Department to its Accounting Department for payment to title agents, sometimes submitting the requests himself.

Ramos allegedly caused checks to be issued from the victim company to certain parties, including a Las Vegas DMV services business. The checks were supposed to cover expenses for tax, titling, and licensing associated with car purchases.

However, Ramos purposely caused his employer to send too much money to the outside entities. He then directed those entities on how to dispose of the extra money, including by sending the funds to bank accounts that he controlled.

Ramos is an illegal alien from Mexico who was removed from the United States in 2017 but later returned.

A complaint contains allegations that a defendant has committed a crime. Every defendant is presumed to be innocent until and unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in court.

The FBI and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Office of Inspector General are investigating this matter.

Assistant United States Attorney Kevin Fu of the Orange County Office is prosecuting this case.

Operation Enduring Sentinel continues U.S. military operations in Afghanistan after Operation Enduring Freedom and seeks to contain terrorist threats to the U.S. emanating from Afghanistan. This lead IG consists of Defense Dept. and State Dept. IG activity.

# Operation Enduring Sentinel



# Causes of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan

Figure 1.

**Causes of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan, August 15, 2021–May 30, 2023**




**Source:** UNAMA, "Impact of Improvised Explosive Devices on Civilians in Afghanistan," 6/27/2023.

# Al-Qaeda Activity

## AL-QAEDA ACTIVITY

### UN: Taliban Shelters Al-Qaeda While Reining in Terrorist Activity

Al-Qaeda's core leadership likely has fewer than a dozen members in Afghanistan, and al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent has about 200 members in Afghanistan. The DIA said that it has not observed any significant changes in the number of al-Qaeda or affiliated fighters in Afghanistan compared to the past quarter. Al-Qaeda's compliance with the Taliban's directives not to conduct external terrorist operations has likely hindered the group's recruitment and retention efforts.[27]

In early June, a UN monitoring team reported that the Taliban is providing sanctuary to al-Qaeda affiliates.[28] Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid rejected the report's findings and claimed that the Taliban is complying with its counterterrorism obligations under the U.S.-Taliban agreement signed in 2020, also known as the "Doha agreement."[29] The DIA said it did not observe any indicators of al-Qaeda senior leaders providing guidance, funding, or propaganda support to its regional affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, or other global affiliates this quarter.[30]

A recently declassified National Intelligence Council assessment originally written in September 2022 predicted that al-Qaeda would likely prioritize preserving its sanctuary over conducting operational activity in Afghanistan through at least 2024. The assessment said that al-Qaeda does not currently have the personnel, infrastructure, or unique capabilities to pose a threat to the United States from Afghanistan.[31]

# Afghan SIV, Asylum, & Refugee Applicants

Figure 3.

**SIV, Asylum, and Refugee Applicants During the Quarter**

**OPERATION ALLIES WELCOME ASYLUM REQUESTS**
(As of June 8)

**1,793**
USCIS applications received

**1,278**
USCIS applications processed

**REFUGEE ARRIVALS**
(As of June 8)

**1,713** Afghans arrived to the United States, bringing the total to **3,698** arrivals in FY 2023.

**2,300** Afghan refugee applicants interviewed in 20 countries, bringing the total to approximately **13,000** interviewed since October 2020.

**Source:** DHS OIG, response to DoD OIG request for information, 23.3 WOG DHS 02, 7/6/2023.

# US AID Humanitarian Assistance Funding by Sector

Figure 4.

**USAID Humanitarian Assistance Funding by Sector, FY 2023**




**Notes:** Numbers may not add to total due to rounding. *Includes Humanitarian Coordination, Info Management & Assessments, Shelter and Settlements, Economic Recovery and Market Systems, Agriculture and Food Security, Travel, and Admin Support.

**Source:** USAID BHA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 6/22/2023.

World Food Programme provided food assistance and nutrition services; the UN Food and Agriculture Organization and international NGO implementers provided seeds and livestock feed in at-risk areas; and UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and other implementers delivered nutrition services to children and pregnant women throughout Afghanistan.[128] USAID provided the World Food Programme with more than $422 million for food assistance in Afghanistan in FY 2023, including $78.5 million this quarter.[129]

# Report Details

### DEFENDANT TOOK BRIBES TO STEER CONTRACTS MEANT TO AID RECONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN

Based on a joint DCIS, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and SIGAR investigation, a Georgia man was sentenced on April 12 to 3 years and 10 months in prison for his roles in





two bribery conspiracies—one related to a U.S. military contracts fraud scheme and one related to a Department of State visa fraud scheme.

According to court documents, Orlando Clark, 57, of Smyrna, was a project manager who deployed to Afghanistan to evaluate bids for U.S.-funded reconstruction contracts awarded by the U.S. military in 2011 and 2012. At that time, Clark and co-conspirator Todd Coleman, an analyst at a different U.S. company who also deployed to Afghanistan, received approximately $400,000 in bribes from an Afghan company. The bribes were paid in return for Clark and Coleman assisting the company in obtaining millions of dollars through at least 10 contracts that involved the construction of an Afghan police station and a security

# United States Secret Service Expenses Incurred at Trump Turnberry Resort

View Report

| | |
|---|---|
| **Date Issued** | Wednesday, March 18, 2020 |
| **Submitting OIG** | Department of Homeland Security OIG |
| **Other Participating OIGs** | Department of Homeland Security OIG |
| **Agencies Reviewed/Investigated** | Department of Homeland Security |
| **Components** | United States Secret Service (USSS) |
| **Report Number** | OIG-20-18 |
| **Report Description** | The U.S. Secret Service incurred operational and temporary duty costs for rental cars, hotel rooms, meals and incidentals, overtime pay, commercial airfare, golf cart rentals, and other logistical support. Certain details of the cost information related to the Secret Service's protective operations presented in the report are designated as Law Enforcement Sensitive. We did not include salaries and benefits for government personnel traveling with the President because the Secret Service would have incurred these costs regardless of whether the President traveled. Also excluded are costs associated with assistance provided by the Department of Defense, such as the use of military aircraft to transport personnel and equipment, because the Secret Service is not required to reimburse these costs. We did not identify any fraud indicators or unauthorized costs. We made no recommendations. |
| **Report Type** | Audit |
| **Agency Wide** | Yes |
| **Number of** | 0 |

**Department of Homeland Security OIG**

Website

United States

13 pages

~~LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE~~

# Resort Expenses

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

**United States Secret Service Expenses Incurred at Trump Turnberry Resort (REDACTED)**

~~LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE WARNING: The information in this document shaded in black is Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES). It is the property of the Department of Homeland Security and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) to law~~

# Audit Findin

**March 18, 2020**

## Why We Did This Audit

The United States Secret Service (Secret Service) protects the President and his family, including other protectees. Members of Congress asked the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) to audit the expenses incurred by the Secret Service for President Trump's visit to the Trump Turnberry Resort in Scotland from July 14 to 15, 2018.

## What We Recommend

This report contains no recommendations.

## What We Found

The Secret Service incurred an estimated [redacted] for President Trump's visit to the Trump Turnberry Resort in Scotland from July 14 to 15, 2018. This amount represents the operational and temporary duty costs associated with supporting [redacted] Secret Service personnel who traveled to Scotland before, during, and after the President's visit. Of the total amount, the Secret Service paid an aggregated amount of $9,662 to the Turnberry Resort for hotel rooms, golf carts, and logistical support. A breakdown of costs appears below:

**Estimated Total Costs**

| Description | Total |
|---|---|
| Rental Cars | $466,424 |
| Hotel Rooms | $322,427 |
| Meals and Incidental | [redacted] |
| Overtime Pay | $84,899 |
| Commercial Airfare | $63,744 |
| Logistical Support | $11,719 |
| Golf Cart Rental | $4,048 |
| **Total** | [redacted] |

*Source:* OIG analysis of agency data

These figures do not include salaries and benefits for government personnel traveling with the President, which the Secret Service would have incurred regardless of whether the President traveled. Also excluded are costs

# Memo Intro

Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

March 18, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable James M. Murray
Director
United States Secret Service

FROM: Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.
Inspector General

SUBJECT: *United States Secret Service Expenses Incurred at Trump Turnberry Resort – ~~Law Enforcement Sensitive~~*

Attached for your information is our final report, *United States Secret Service Expenses Incurred at Trump Turnberry Resort – ~~Law Enforcement Sensitive~~*. The Secret Service did not provide any formal technical comments for this report. No recommendations were made.

Consistent with our responsibility under the *Inspector General Act*, we provide copies of our report to congressional committees with oversight and appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We also post the redacted version of the report on our website for public dissemination.

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Sondra McCauley, Assistant Inspector General for Audits, at (202) 981-6000.

Attachment

# Report Distribution Recipients

## Appendix A
## Report Distribution

**Department of Homeland Security**

Secretary
Deputy Secretary
Chief of Staff
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
General Counsel
Executive Secretary
Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office
Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy
Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs
Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs
Director, United States Secret Service
Audit Liaison, United States Secret Service

**Office of Management and Budget**

Chief, Homeland Security Branch
DHS OIG Budget Examiner

**Congress**

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees
U.S. Senator Tom Carper
U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren

# Top Management and Performance Challenges

Read our annual report identifying the top management and performance challenges facing the Department of Justice.

Read the Challenges

# Bureau of Prison DOJ Audit Rpts.

**Audit of the Federal Prison Industries, Inc. Annual Financial Statements Fiscal Years 2023 and 2022**
Posted Date: December 16, 2025
Report Type: Audit

**Audit of the Federal Prison Industries, Inc. Restated Annual Financial Statements Fiscal Year 2021**
Posted Date: December 16, 2025
Report Type: Audit

**A Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Querying Practices Under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act**
Posted Date: October 2, 2025
Report Type: Review

**Notification of Concerns Regarding Conditions at Federal Correctional Institution Terre Haute**
Posted Date: October 2, 2025
Report Type: Management Advisory Memorandum

**Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Residential Reentry Center Contracts Awarded to The Kintock Group, Inc.**
Posted Date: October 1, 2025
Report Type: Audit

Status as of
**December 31, 2025**

Open Recommendations
**583**

Dollar-Related Open Recommendations
**$204,454,946**

## Filter Options

Keywords

# Terre Haute Prison Conditions

## Notification of Concerns Regarding Conditions at Federal Correctional Institution Terre Haute

Read Report

| | |
|---|---|
| Posted Date | October 2, 2025 |
| Report Number | 26-001 |
| Component | Federal Bureau of Prisons |
| Report Type | Management Advisory Memorandum |
| Number of Recommendations | 3 |

# DOJ
# IG report findings

**13 pp.**

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE | OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

MANAGEMENT ADVISORY MEMORANDUM

26-001

OCTOBER 2025

Notification of Concerns Regarding Conditions at Federal Correctional Institution Terre Haute

# Report Intro.

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) concerns regarding conditions observed during a recent OIG site visit of the medium-security prison at Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Terre Haute, which is a part of Federal Correctional Complex (FCC) Terre Haute.[1] We identified issues with temperature regulation, sanitation, and infrastructure that can negatively affect the safety and security of staff and inmates at FCI Terre Haute. Specifically, during our site visit from July 28 through July 30, 2025, the OIG measured temperatures as high as 89 degrees Fahrenheit (F) in inmate housing units, found unsanitary conditions in food storage areas, and observed broken or damaged windows in inmate cells and common areas. The OIG identified these concerns while conducting site work at FCI Terre Haute as part of our evaluation examining the BOP's use of lockdowns and modified operations.

## Background and Prior OIG Work[2]

Through our prior oversight work, we have found that multiple BOP facilities have experienced temperature regulation issues and broader infrastructure challenges. For example, both our 2019 inspection and review of Metropolitan Detention Center Brooklyn and our 2024 inspection of FCI Lewisburg identified institution temperatures outside of ranges set in BOP policy and found that these institutions lacked reliable methods to regulate and measure temperatures. In addition, while conducting concurrent inspections of food service operations at six BOP institutions in 2024, we identified temperature concerns. We recorded a temperature of 93 degrees F in a kitchen area at FCI Marianna. At FCC Pollock, we recorded a temperature of 86 degrees F in a kitchen area; one Food Service Department employee described the kitchen as "extremely hot" and stated that inmates were working in "brutal heat." Additionally, in 2023, we reported on serious food safety

[1] FCC Terre Haute is composed of FCI Terre Haute, which includes a medium-security prison, a satellite minimum-

# Specific problems at Terre Haute prison

## The Issues of Concern

BOP policy sets a temperature target of 76 degrees F for its institutions during the summer, with qualifying language stating that "occupants may experience a range of temperatures in their space that is a few degrees on either side of the targeted set point." The BOP's Clinical Guidance on the Prevention and Management of Heat-Related Illness, which warns of the risk factors associated with heat-related illness, states that high ambient air temperature and humidity are the primary underlying risks for heat-related illness and that evaporation becomes less effective in dissipating heat as humidity increases and becomes totally ineffective at humidity levels greater than 75 percent. On July 28 and July 29, 2025, when outside temperatures reached highs of 92 degrees F and 93 degrees F, respectively, we measured temperatures in FCI Terre Haute housing unit common areas and cells that ranged from 79 to 89 degrees F. In addition to high temperatures, we found that humidity levels in these areas ranged from 62 to 94 percent. Inmates and staff we spoke with during the site visit described the heat as having negative effects on the conditions of confinement for inmates.


*Left,* OIG Measurement of 89 Degrees F, with 79 Percent Humidity, in an Inmate Cell, *Right,* OIG Measurement of 79 Degrees F, with 94 Percent Humidity, in an Inmate Cell

Source: OIG, July 28, 2025 (Text Overlays and Arrows Added for Clarity, Product Information Blurred)

# Recommendations for Terre Haute prison

In addition to the OIG's existing recommendations involving BOP infrastructure, given the conditions we observed at FCI Terre Haute, we recommend that the BOP:

1. Identify methods to mitigate the impacts of elevated temperatures on staff and inmates at Federal Correctional Institution Terre Haute, particularly for inmates susceptible to heat-related illness.

2. Determine the scope of the pest control problem within the dry-food storage areas at Federal Correctional Institution Terre Haute and address it.

3. Until permanent repairs planned by the BOP can be completed at Federal Correctional Institution Terre Haute, assess what steps can be taken to mitigate safety and security risks associated with window disrepair and make temporary repairs to the windows that present the greatest potential safety and security risks at the institution.

cc: James McHenry
Acting Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General and Senior Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Deputy Attorney General

# NSF audit of Purdue contract funds

View Report

| | |
|---|---|
| **Date Issued** | Monday, March 20, 2017 |
| **Submitting OIG** | National Science Foundation OIG |
| **Other Participating OIGs** | National Science Foundation OIG |
| **Agencies Reviewed/Investigated** | National Science Foundation |
| **Report Number** | 17-1-003 |
| **Report Type** | Audit |
| **Location** | West Lafayette, IN<br>United States |
| **Number of Recommendations** | 4 |
| **Questioned Costs** | $91,281 |
| **Funds for Better Use** | $0 |
| **External Entity** | Purdue University |

Audit details

# Performance Audit of Incurred Costs — Purdue University

Report No. 17-1-003, March 20, 2017

## Audit Objective

The National Science Foundation (NSF) Office of Inspector General (OIG) engaged WithumSmith+Brown (WSB) to conduct a performance audit of incurred costs at Purdue University (PU) for the period April 1, 2012, to March 31, 2015. The audit encompassed more than $238 million comprising all costs claimed to NSF. The objective of the audit was to determine if costs claimed by PU during this period were allocable, allowable, reasonable, and in conformity with NSF award terms and conditions and applicable Federal financial assistance requirements.

WSB is responsible for the attached auditor's report and the conclusions expressed in this report. The NSF OIG does not express any opinion on the conclusions presented in WSB's audit report.

## Recommendations

The auditors included four findings in the report with associated recommendations for NSF to resolve the questioned costs and to ensure PU strengthens administrative and management controls.

## Contact Information

For further information, contact the NSF OIG at (703) 292-7100 or oig@nsf.gov.

## Audit Results

Costs PU charged to its NSF-sponsored agreements did not comply with Federal and NSF award requirements. The auditors questioned $91,281 of costs claimed by PU during the audit period. Specifically, auditors found:

- $36,437 in unreasonable travel;
- $28,984 in unreasonable expenditures;
- $25,011 in equipment, materials, and supplies unreasonably purchased near the award expiration date; and
- $849 in insufficiently documented travel charges.

## Agency Response

PU disagreed with the four findings in the report. PU contends that the costs within the findings are allowable and disagreed with the auditors' interpretation of the Federal guidance. PU also did not agree with the auditors' statements that there were weaknesses in management and administrative controls. After taking PU's comments into consideration, the auditors continue to question the costs and left the findings unchanged.

Although PU disagreed with the fourth finding, it concurred it did not have adequate documentation to support the claimed costs.

PU's response is attached in its entirety to the report as Appendix A.

# Purdue audit details

Purdue University
Audit of Incurred Costs for
National Science Foundation Awards
For the Period April 1, 2012 to March 31, 2015

withum
AUDIT TAX ADVISORY

# Purdue response

PURDUE
UNIVERSITY

SPONSORED PROGRAM SERVICES

February 13, 2017

WithumSmith+Brown, PC
Two Logan Square, Suite 2001
Eighteenth and Arch Streets
Philadelphia, PA 19103-2726

Re: Purdue University Response to the "Purdue University Audit of Incurred Costs for National Science Foundation Awards, for the Period April 1, 2012 to March 31, 2015"

Purdue University (Purdue) has reviewed the draft report entitled "Purdue University Audit of Incurred Costs for National Science Foundation Awards, for the Period April 1, 2012 to March 31, 2015." Purdue wishes to acknowledge the support provided by the National Science Foundation for research conducted at Purdue, which has enabled the advancement of science.

Below are our responses addressing the findings in the report.

**Finding 1 – Unreasonable Travel**

Purdue does not concur with this finding, totaling $36,437. We believe that adequate evidence of allowability, allocability and reasonableness was provided. We do not believe there was a weakness of our administrative and management controls and processes for reviewing and approving these travel expenditures. These travel costs benefited the award, were consistent and necessary to accomplish the objectives of the revised budget impact statement of the project, and were compliant with NSF policy. Specifically, these travel costs were incurred by the main Principal Investigator (PI) of an NSF SI2 Conceptualization Award that had as its main goal the aim to build a community that would support and be involved in the NSF SI2 institute proposal on the topic of Dynamic Languages for Scalable Data Analytics. Due to the budget limitations, work would be shifted to the main PI who would get a course reduction to spend time on the project.

The annual report submitted and accepted by NSF stated under the project's goals that while the project staff view the impact of a software institute as applying to many disciplines , it was also important to start with a focused effort and involve stake-holder communities that would actively contribute to its success.

**Finding 2 – Unreasonable Expenditures**

Purdue does not agree that these transactions, totaling $28,984, were not in accordance with Federal Cost Principles. Adequate evidence of allowability, allocability and reasonableness was provided. We do not believe there was a weakness of our administrative and management controls and processes for reviewing and approving these expenditures.

# Purdue Response

and is appropriate and reasonable.

**Finding 4 – Inadequate Documentation**

Purdue does not agree that costs of $849 for lodging charges should be disallowed; however, we concur that we did not have adequate comparative documentation supporting "considerable airfare savings". We do not believe there was a weakness of our administrative and management controls and processes for reviewing and approving these expenditures.

- $849 for lodging charges: This charge is for a fourth night of lodging for 8 international participants who were attending an IHUB annual meeting in [redacted] The invitation to the meeting stated a fourth night would be reimbursed to international participants if the stay resulted in a considerable airfare savings. The extra night lodging did allow the 8 participants the opportunity to continue networking on their research since they live all over the world.

Sincerely,

[redacted]

Ken L. Sandel
Senior Director,
Sponsored Program Services

# U.S. Agency for Int. Development



## Fraud Alert: Ethiopia-Beneficiaries Solicited for Kickbacks During Humanitarian Registration

Advisory

Feb 11, 2026

This document highlights ongoing fraud schemes involving U.S.-funded humanitarian programs in central and northwestern Ethiopia.

# Ethiopia Criminal details

## Ethiopia: Beneficiaries Solicited for Kickbacks During Humanitarian Registration

**This document highlights ongoing fraud schemes involving U.S.-funded humanitarian programs in central and northwestern Ethiopia.**

### Schemes

The U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General (OIG) is alerting USAID, the State Department, and the public to allegations of systemic program fraud in multiple regions of Ethiopia. OIG received numerous reports that community leaders abuse their authority to extort payments from beneficiaries. Although the Ethiopian government drafted a National Disaster Risk Management Policy in 2023 in response to OIG investigative findings, the policy appears ineffective at preventing beneficiary exploitation.

***Example 1: Extortion During Program Registration***

OIG received numerous reports that local community leaders in Oromia, Afar, and Tigray demanded payments from beneficiaries as a condition for program participation. In some cases, leaders falsely claimed the payments supported political or holiday funds. Awardee staff were reportedly present during some instances of this fraud.

***Example 2: Removal from Distribution Lists and Replacement***

Reports indicated that some eligible beneficiaries were removed from distribution lists during verification procedures. Ineligible individuals were then allegedly solicited for bribes or kickbacks to receive benefits. Subsequently, community leaders or program staff reportedly replaced the eligible beneficiaries they had removed from the distribution lists with these ineligible beneficiaries.

***Example 3: Threats of Removal for Complaints***

Reports alleged community leaders and local program staff threatened beneficiaries with removal from distribution lists if they reported fraud or other wrongdoing. This coercion was intended to suppress external complaints.

***Remember: No one should pay to register for humanitarian programs or assistance. Awardees must reinforce training and ethics messaging and remove bad actors.***

# Gaza report problems


Gaza Response: USAID Ensured Health Supply Chain Plans Addressed Quality Risks but Did Not Actively Monitor All Project Components

Report E-294-26-001-M
February 2, 2026

# Gaza Rpt. Conclusion

## Conclusion

USAID ensured IMC met pre-award requirements for the quality of pharmaceuticals and other medical commodities intended to be procured and delivered for the Gaza response. However, BHA focused its monitoring efforts on IMC operations and facilities inside Gaza and relied on IMC to oversee and self-report challenges related to the procurement, storage, and transportation of BHA-funded health commodities as they moved through the supply chain on the way to Gaza. Safeguards related to pharmaceuticals and other medical commodities and approaches used to monitor award implementation are critically important to ensure programming is operating effectively and reaching its intended beneficiaries. As the administration considers oversight approaches for future foreign assistance programs, it has an opportunity to examine the Gaza response, including USAID's challenges related to monitoring in nonpermissive environments and clarifying roles and responsibilities in implementer-managed

[13] USAID Office of Inspector General, *Responsibility to Identify and Report Potential Diversion of U.S Humanitarian Aid to Hamas and Other Foreign Terrorist Organizations*, November 2023.



supply chains. Given USAID's current operating status, we are not making recommendations at this time.

## Considerations for Future Foreign Assistance

As the administration determines the future of foreign assistance, we suggest decision makers consider the following actions:

1. Develop clear roles and responsibilities for agency staff overseeing implementer-managed supply chains for U.S.-government funded humanitarian assistance, including the procurement, storage, transportation, and distribution of this assistance.

## OIG Response to Agency Comments

We provided our draft report to USAID on December 8, 2025. On January 28, 2026, we received the Agency's response. The Agency did not have any comments on the draft report.

# Council of Inspectors General

# Council Inspectors General Mission

## Mission

**The Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) was statutorily established as an independent entity within the executive branch by the "The Inspector General Reform Act of 2008," P.L. 110-409 to:**

- Address integrity, economy, and effectiveness issues that transcend individual Government agencies; and
- Increase the professionalism and effectiveness of personnel by developing policies, standards, and approaches to aid in the establishment of a well-trained and highly skilled workforce in the offices of the Inspectors General.

# CIGIE Budget Submission



# Executive Summary

The Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency's (CIGIE's) fiscal year (FY) 2026 budget request is $22.5 million, of which $1.85 million is requested as direct appropriations. The direct appropriations consist of $850,000 for Oversight.gov, and $1 million for the data analytics center. The remaining budget is collected from assessments from the 72 Offices of Inspector General (OIGs) that are members of CIGIE, and tuition collected to offset costs incurred by the CIGIE Training Institute.

The $1.85 million requested as a direct appropriation includes $850,000 to support the ongoing operations, maintenance, and improvements of Oversight.gov. The funding will also allow CIGIE to host additional OIG websites in further support of Inspector General (IG) independence and support the redesign and refresh of the website to optimize stakeholders' user experience.

The direct appropriation request also includes $1 million for CIGIE to continue some analytics capabilities developed under the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee's (PRAC) Pandemic Analytics Center of Excellence (PACE) within the limits of CIGIE's existing authorities. The PRAC is scheduled to sunset on September 30, 2025.

CIGIE is modifying the organization to ensure that the 34 full-time equivalents (FTE) are focused on statutorily mandated functions. By the end of FY 2025, CIGIE will have eliminated four management positions and re-aligned FTE to better deliver services to the OIG community.

# HHS OIG Congressional Budget Request


HHS-OIG Fiscal Year 2026

Justification of Estimates for Congress

# HHS IG Message

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

## Message from the Acting Inspector General

I am pleased to present the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG) fiscal year (FY) 2026 budget submission. OIG would use the requested funds to fulfill our statutory mission to fight fraud, waste, and abuse in HHS programs and to promote their economy, efficiency, and effectiveness.

OIG's estimated $454.4 million FY 2026 Program Level is composed of $367.4 million for oversight of Medicare and Medicaid and $87 million for oversight of HHS's other programs, such as the activities of the National Institutes of Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and Food and Drug Administration.

With the requested funding, OIG will continue to stop sophisticated fraud schemes and hold wrongdoers accountable; uncover safety risks; and help provide assurances that enrollees in HHS programs get the services to which they are entitled without waste to taxpayer dollars. OIG uses specialized skills and expertise from across multiple disciplines, advanced analytics, artificial intelligence, state-of-the art techniques, and strategic partnerships to meet our mission to protect HHS programs. OIG's potential for positive impact on accountability, transparency, and public trust is capped only by our resource levels.

OIG delivers results for the American people. Our independent, objective oversight is firmly grounded in professional standards and consistently yields a strong return on taxpayers' investment. The return on the investment in our work is $11 in expected recoveries and receivables to the Government for every $1 invested in OIG. In FY 2024 alone, OIG's work resulted in more than $7 billion in expected recoveries and receivables.

OIG appreciates the continued support of Congress and HHS for oversight that makes the Nation's health and human services programs more efficient and effective in enhancing the health and well-being of all Americans.

HHS
OIG
Full-Ti

## FTE is Full-Time Employees



## All-Purpose Table

| OIG (dollars in millions) | FY 2024 | | FY 2025 | | FY 2026 | | FY 2026 +/- FY 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Final | FTE | Enacted | FTE | President's Budget | FTE | Amount | FTE |
| **PHHS Oversight** | | | | | | | | |
| **Discretionary Budget Authority (BA)** | $87.000 | | $87.000 | | $87.000 | | $0.000 | |
| **FDA Transfer** | 1.500 | | 1.500 | | | | (1.500) | |
| **NIH Transfer** | 5.000 | | 5.000 | | | | (5.000) | |
| **Subtotal, PHHS BA** | 93.500 | 327 | 93.500 | 310 | 87.000 | 272 | (6.500) | (38) |
| **HCFAC Oversight** | | | | | | | | |
| **HCFAC Mandatory BA** | 236.276 | | 243.601 | | 249.691 | | 6.090 | |
| **HCFAC Discretionary BA** | 107.735 | | 108.735 | | 108.735 | | 0.000 | |
| **Subtotal, HCFAC BA** | 344.011 | | 352.336 | | 358.426 | | 6.090 | |
| **HCFAC Collections** | 9.311 | | 9.000 | | 9.000 | | 0.000 | |
| **Subtotal, HCFAC PL** | 353.322 | 1,225 | 361.336 | 1,196 | 367.426 | 1,197 | 6.090 | 1 |
| **TOTAL BA** | 437.511 | | 445.836 | | 445.426 | | (0.410) | |
| **TOTAL PL** | $446.822 | 1,552 | $454.836 | 1,506 | $454.426 | 1,469 | ($0.410) | (37) |

# Proposed legislation H.R. 8312 House Rpt. 119-683 (2026)

**Fraud Prevention and Accountability Act-Would establish a fraud a voluntary fraud prevention and data accountability entity within the Dept. of the Treasury.**

# Benefits of Oversight.gov/ Resources

- Gain detailed policy oriented information and evidence on performance of government programs including successes, failures, and ambiguities.
- Recognize that the failings of human nature and institutions can result in personal and organizational corruption, incompetence, and mismanagement of these programs.
- Congressional creation of govt. programs can also produce problems in their execution and effectiveness.
- Gain enhanced understanding of these programs and the investigative process.
- Learn how agencies respond to IG report findings.
- Recognize that problems in agency programs may be long-standing and perpetual.
- Don’t just rely on a quick news release, social media clickbait, or superficial examination of reports.

# Benefits of Oversight.gov/ Resources Continued

- At bare minimum, we and our users should carefully read the executive summaries of these reports along with conclusions and recommendations.
- More assiduous users should read the entire report and become familiar with other reports on these subjects and also include GAO reports to enhance their understanding of particular topics.
- If concerned about report and program findings communicate this to your congressional Rep./Senator; particularly if they are on a congressional oversight committee for a particular agency and its problem program(s).
- Don’t assume that an OIG’s budget or workforce size necessarily reflect the quality of their reporting.

# Questions