George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies Information Resources

Professor Bert Chapman
Government Information, History, and Political Science Librarian
Purdue University Libraries and School of Information Studies
April 27, 2022
George C. Marshall (1880-1959)

• Born in Uniontown, PA
• Attended Virginia Military Institute (VMI)
• Served in U.S. Army from 1902-1947
• Army Chief of Staff 1939-1945. Winston Churchill said Marshall was the “true architect of victory” in World War II’s Western European theater.
• Served as President Truman’s envoy to China unsuccessfully attempting to end civil war between Communists and Nationalists

• U.S. Secretary of State 1947-1949. Promoted economic reconstruction and assistance plan for Europe, including areas occupied by Soviet Union which rejected what became known as Marshall Plan. Western Europe gradually recovered due to this assistance.

• Key figure in 1949 establishment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

• Secretary of Defense 1950-1951 and oversaw creation of international military force to repel North Korean invasion of South Korea

• Received 1953 Nobel Peace Prize for European reconstruction efforts and promotion of international cooperation
Located in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany
Collaboration between U.S. Department of Defense and Germany Federal Ministry of Defense (Bundesministerium fur Verteidigung)

• Dedicated in 1993
• Addresses regional and transnational security issues for these two defense ministries.
• Promotes dialogue and understanding among North American, European, and Eurasian nations.
• Includes international faculty and staff representatives from 10 partner nations.

• Besides European theater security cooperation strategies and initiatives, the Marshall Center supports the following Central and South Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Has supporting relationship with Mongolia.
Institutional mission

• Areas of Strategic Interest:
  • In addition to our resident courses that focus on regional and transnational topics, our strategic interests include: the Trans-Atlantic Relationship; Great Power Competition and the role of Russia and China in Europe; Ukraine Defense Reform; the Western Balkans; the nexus between European and African Security Challenges; the High North; and, the Relationship between NATO and the European Union

• Our Commitment
  • The Marshall Center contributes to security cooperation with tailored, professional education and research, dialogue, and the persistent, thorough, and thoughtful examination of issues that confront our region and the world both today and in the years ahead. Those who attend Marshall Center courses will have an opportunity to identify common values, create transnational friendships, work toward common understandings, and build a more peaceful and cooperative regional and global security environment.
ADMISSIONS INFORMATION

The Marshall Center’s objective is to bring together the best and most capable rising defense and security experts from a variety of government ministries. We strive for a balanced and diverse participant body which includes civilian and military, men and women, policy-makers and practitioners. Candidates should benefit from our programs and the opportunity to network with like-minded professionals as well as add value to an ongoing dialog on security and defense related topics. All Marshall Center courses strive for balanced gender participation and we strongly encourage applications from women.

In order to ensure a diverse selection of participants, we encourage our U.S. Embassy representatives to work closely within their own Country Team to coordinate nominations from the various ministries, such as: defense, interior, foreign affairs, emergency services, border guards, internal and external intelligence services.

Government officials who meet the course qualifications and would like to participate in a Marshall Center resident program must begin by contacting their ministry or parent organization 120 days before the start of the program they wish to attend. Ministries or parent organizations may then nominate participants for Marshall Center programs through the Marshall Center liaison at the United States Embassy or German Embassy in their countries. Nominations should reach the Marshall Center Registrar’s office sixty (60) days before the course begins.
Ways for Applying for Marshall Center Courses—Should start at least 120 days before course date

• Funded Participant: Government officials (military and civilian) who meet course admissions criteria must be nominated by their country ministry or agency and the nomination must be forwarded to the U.S. Embassy Security Cooperation Officer (SCO) in their country. Once approved by the SCO and forwarded to the Marshall Center, final approval of the applicant is contingent on the GCMC Course Director’s acceptance based on the qualifications of the applicant.

• Self-Payer: Individuals who meet course admissions criteria may apply through the U.S. Embassy in their country or directly through the Registrar's Office. Selection for Marshall Center courses is granted pending agency or employer approval, course availability, and GCMC Course Director’s approval. The Registrar's Office will provide information on the admissions process and associated course costs upon request.
Marshall Center Courses focus on security studies, cyber security, transnational organized crime, terrorism, & regional security

- Program on Applied Security Studies (10 weeks)
- English language enhancement course (5 weeks)
- Program on Terrorism & Security Studies (4 weeks)
- Program on Countering Transnational Organized Crime (3 weeks)
- Program on Cybersecurity Studies (3 weeks)
- Seminar on Regional Security (3 weeks)

- European African Security Seminar (1 week)
- European Security Seminar-East (1 week)
- European Security Seminar-South (1 week)
- European Security Seminar-North (1 week)
- Senior Executive Seminar (1 week)
- Programming on Countering Transnational Organized Crime International Forum (3 days)
European Security Seminar–East (ESS–E)

Former Soviet Spaces in a Time of Corona and Unrest: Stocktaking and Outlook

March 15–19, 2021 / Course language: English

Background

Previous one-week seminars elaborated responses taken by the international community to counter Russian hybrid and gray zone warfare measures. They discussed the Kremlin’s aggression in Ukraine, its role in protracted conflicts, and multi-faceted attempts to disturb political landscapes in the West, as well as the need for the Euro-Atlantic community to formulate strategic communications to counter Moscow’s agenda and the impact of economic sanctions.
The Seminar

The 2021 iteration of the ESS–E will focus on how earlier historic tremors became obvious since August 2020: The fraudulent presidential election of August 9 in Belarus caused domestic and regional instability, as did the poisoning of Russian opposition member Navalny with Novichok on August 20; the armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan that started on September 27; and lastly, the fraudulent parliamentary elections of October 4 in Kyrgyzstan. This ESS–E will explore how Moscow's engagement with those developments varies in intensity, because it has been apparent that Russia could not resist participating in and attempting to influence the dynamics. The course will also debate the extent to which Russia’s severe domestic socio-economic challenges (i.e. political stalemate and mismanagement related to the COVID–19 pandemic) limit the extent of its regional role.

This seminar brings together mid- to senior-level security practitioners from Europe, Eurasia, and the U.S. to build a common understanding of the challenges along Europe’s eastern flank. The event will feature subject matter experts from the Marshall Center, as well as guest lecturers. Graduates will become part of the Marshall Center’s network of professionals who will engage in continued interaction, dialogue, and cooperation.
Objectives and Outcome

The seminar wishes to embrace Europe’s Eastern Flank and the Euro-Atlantic community as a whole, jointly countering Moscow’s behavior and stressing the promotion of resilience among partners and allies. It is structured and designed to allow the capture of insights as to how to strengthen the capacity and capability of its neighbors and potential EU and NATO partners.

Marshall Center faculty members, along with guest lecturers, will conduct this seminar. The Center will invite representatives from the EU Eastern Partnership, NATO PfP, Eastern EU/NATO members, and Nordic partners.

Main Activities

The ESS-E addresses the topic by providing two different platforms for discussions, exchange of ideas, networking, and strategy development. The first platform is conducted in a conference-style format of lectures, panels, and plenary discussions; the second is conducted in an outcome-oriented and product-driven topical seminar format led by in-house staff.
EUROPEAN SECURITY SEMINAR – EAST (ESS-E)
ENGLISH & RUSSIAN

Background
This one-week seminar analyzes security issues related to Europe’s Eastern flank. Previous seminars elaborated on responses taken by the international community to counter hybrid and grey zone warfare measures by Russia, the Kremlin’s aggression in Ukraine, its role in protracted conflicts, multi-faceted attempts to disturb the political landscape in the West, how the Euro-Atlantic community can use strategic communication in order to counter Moscow’s agenda and the impact of economic sanctions. The 2021 ESS-E examined Moscow’s role in former Soviet Spaces in the Time of Corona and Unrest.

The 2022 iteration explores the relationship between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. Have Sino-Russian relations developed to a degree that these two powers threaten the community of liberal democracies by forming an alliance? If forming an institutionalized military or political alliance by China and Russia continues to remain unlikely, what is the content of the Chinese-Russian strategic partnership? What is the state of military cooperation between Moscow and Beijing? Taking into account China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), how are economic ties developing between China and Russia? What is the effect of various levels of cooperation between China and Russia on the West, and how can the U.S., the European Union and like-minded partners influence the relationship between Beijing and Moscow? The course also discusses official rhetoric by
Objectives
- Engage a range of partners in better understanding conflict dynamics in Europe’s eastern flank;
- Highlight challenges to and within Euro-Atlantic Institutions;
- Identify current Euro-Atlantic vulnerabilities and how they might be exploited. These include hard power tools; protracted conflicts; transnational organized crime, political corruption and undermining political institutions; economic integration and disintegration tendencies and energy security;
- Assess and align potential Euro-Atlantic policy responses to fit new realities.
- The final results of the European Security Seminar-East are published as a conference report.

The Participants
This seminar brings together mid- to senior level security practitioners from Europe, Eurasia, and the U.S. to build a common understanding of the new dynamics in the east and to develop comprehensive strategies to address conflicts, vulnerability and disorder. The seminar produces a network of professionals for continued dialogue and cooperation.
Introducing the Leadership Team

• Course Director, Sebastian von Münchow, Ph.D.
• Deputy Course Director, Lieutenant Colonel Juan Murillo
• Academic Advisor, Pál Dunay, Ph.D.

Sebastian von Münchow, Ph.D.
Course Director
European Security Seminar EU-NATO Cooperation and European Security Seminar East
Areas of Expertise

• Rule of Law, Good Governance, Public International Law, Constitutional Law
• International Organizations, UN, EU, OSCE
• Southeast European Security Issues
• Great Power Competition and COVID-19

Academic Degrees

• Ph.D., International Relations, University of Vienna
• Master of Law, Christian-Albrechts-University Kiel, Schleswig-Holstein


Prior to joining the Marshall Center, Dr. von Münchow worked for the field missions of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in Kosovo where he led the legislative reform section. He has also served in the Police Assistance Mission of the European Union in
Marshall Center Voices Video Series Webcasts

Marshall Center Voices: Interview with three U.S. Ambassadors to the Western Balkans

December, 2021
In this episode, Marshall Center’s Professor Dr. Valbona Zeneli interviews U.S. Congressman David Price and U.S. Congressman Vern Buchanan, Co-Chairs of the House Democracy Partnership. They provide insightful commentary about the work that HDP is doing to support capacity building of legislators around the world.

The Marshall Center Voices is a unique virtual forum where we invite Marshall Center alumni and special friends to share insights and knowledge on security issues that affect our world.
Marshall Center welcomes Slovene General Staff Course

By College of International Security Studies

George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN, Germany (Mar. 25, 2022) – The Marshall Center welcomed 16 leaders and participants of the war college-level General Staff course of the Slovene Command and Staff School for a two-day seminar on regional security issues 23-24 March. Brigadier General Peter Zakrajšek, Commandant of the Slovene Military Schools Center in Maribor, headed the delegation.

Following opening remarks by Marshall Center Director Major General (retired) Barre Seguin, seminar sessions focused on Russia and Ukraine, gray zone threats, NATO and EU strategic adaptation, China and Euroatlantic security, the Balkans, small state strategies, and a scenario exercise.

Marshall Center professor Dr. Matthew Rhodes noted that participants highlighted ways that Slovenia’s geographic position, historical relationships, and recent EU presidency have shaped their country’s perspectives on regional and broader Euroatlantic issues. They expressed particular appreciation for ways Marshall Center faculty and guest speakers provided highly timely views about the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on their respective topics as well as national and international reactions to the transformed security environment.
The Marshall Center Research Library supports the educational, informational, and research needs of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. We provide up-to-date print and digital resources via books, journals, and multimedia. Services include one-on-one consultations, research assistance, teaching about our resources, preparing research guides, and collaborating with faculty in the College of International and Security Studies.

The Library's collection covers a spectrum of issues on global security, terrorism and cyber-terrorism, democracy and comparative studies, international relations and diplomacy, strategic communication and dialog, as well as peace and stabilization operations including crisis and conflict management. The library houses over 65,000 volumes of books and multimedia in English, German and Russian; maintains over 3,000 eBooks; and subscribes to more than 150 journals.

The Library is located in Building 101 on the ground floor, mezzanine and basement levels. The library is open 8:00 to 5:00pm, Monday through Friday.
The Return of the Russian Leviathan by Sergei Medvedev
Call Number: Online Resource
ISBN: 9781509556061
Publication Date: 2019-12-18

Rossiia i mir v XXI veke by Dmitrii Trenin
Call Number: DK510.764 .T746 2015
ISBN: 5699845860
Publication Date: 2015

Routledge Handbook of Russian Security by Roger E. Kanet (Editor)
Call Number: UA770 .R6338 2019
ISBN: 9780815396710
Publication Date: 2019-01-28
About C-3: Coffee, Conversation, and Collaboration

C3, Coffee, Conversation, and Collaboration is biweekly discussion group fostering timely topics pertinent to the faculty and staff of the Marshall European Center for Security Studies. C3 is held every second Tuesday and fourth Thursday of the month.

Discussion topics can be presented in any manner -- from a brief synopsis to a YouTube video.

The discussion is open-ended and each faculty/staff member is encouraged to bring their expertise to the discussion and are encouraged to discuss:

- What is the topic?
- Why is it important?
- What now?
- What if? Other sides to the story?
- How is it connected to what you are doing at the Marshall Center?
- What can we do with this information at the Marshall Center?

If you are interested in presenting and sharing a topic, please contact Anthony Micchelli or John Crawford.
How Russian Government Controlled News Media Misuses and Abuses Language to Deceive the Masses and Keep Them in Check

Knock-knock! This is police/GEZ/KGB: we have grounds to believe you haven’t been watching TV for too long!
In his 4:00 address to the nation on February 24, 2022, Putin called the collective West an "empire of lies."
United States Army Russian Institute (USARI)

The Marshall Center, established in 1993, inherited a unique collection of materials from the former U.S. Army Russian Institute (USARI). Established in 1947, USARI supported the Department of the Army’s Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program, training thousands of specialists from all military services in Russian language and graduate-level studies in Soviet and Eastern European Studies. The Marshall Center continues to support the program, with Foreign Area Officers regularly participating in Marshall Center resident courses.

The Marshall Center Archives houses the USARI Student Reports, Soviet Posters, and Roots of the Marshall Center. There are over 500 student reports, in Russian and English, submitted in partial fulfillment of course requirements, more than 65 Soviet-era posters depicting the Soviet revolution, its leaders, and its culture; and also news articles and bulletins that provide some information on the roots of the Marshall Center.

Radio Free Europe and Radio Free Liberty

Soviet and satellite railroads: an introductory study
by Hinman, Edward N.
Publisher and date: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies 1954
Copyright: U.S. Army Russian Institute
Restrictions on Access Note: Unlimited distribution, approved for public release
Description: 98 p, 52,338 KB
Collection: USARI Legacy -- Student Reports [sturpt]
Copies: 0 of 1 copy available
Place hold (None pending)  Add to Bookbag

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STUDENT RESEARCH REPORT

1ST LT. EDWARD NELSON HINMAN
SOVIET AND SATELLITE RAILROADS
AN INTRODUCTORY STUDY

-1954-

GARMISCH, GERMANY

APO NEW YORK 09053
Railroad Map of former Soviet Union including Ukraine

- Bucha
- Kyiv
- Mariupol
- Kharkiv
- Donetsk
- Odessa
- Crimea
The east-west railroad across the Donbass is the Yasinovataya (p) – Debaltsevo – Zverovo (q) line, with an extension through Likhaya (r) to Stalingrad. Yasinovataya is an important junction and classification yard, as well as an outlet from the Donbass to the West, to the Krivoj Rog region.

From north to south the Donbass is traversed by the Krasnyj Liman – Nikitovka (s) – Taganrog (t) line, along which a number of large metallurgical, machine-building and chemical plants and coal mines are located. South from Stalino (u) runs a line to Mariupol’ (v), which hails coal to the Mariupol’ metallurgical plant. The Donbass and Krivoj Rog regions are connected by the Stalin Railroad. From the Krivoj Rog area the Stalin Railroad ships iron ore destined for the group of metallurgical plants in the Dnepr region and the Donbass. The railroad receives huge amounts of coal from the Donbass, lumber and consumer goods. The principal coal and ore trunkline between the Donbass and the Krivoj Rog area is the main double-tracked Yasinovataya – Dnepropetrovsk – Dolgintevo (w) line of the South-Donets and Stalin Railroad systems, which handles an extremely heavy freight traffic. Ore for the Zaporozhe (x) metallurgical plant and other plants in the Donbass is carried on the Dolgintevo – Zaporozhe – Pologi (y) – Volnovakha (z) line.
CONCLUSIONS

In drawing up a final evaluation of the present day Soviet railroad network, there are certain general characteristics which are immediately noticeable. With regard to the actual structure of the railroads, the Soviet system is now, and will be for a considerable period in the future, amazingly backward and sparse as compared with the Western European railroad network. Approximately 40 per cent of the entire network is of light construction, with rails far lighter than the normal European rail, without gravel and often without any roadbed at all. While this system has the obvious advantage of saving time and expenditure, it sharply reduces the weight of locomotives and rolling stock which can be used on them, and reduces the speed of traffic. A considerable percentage of the lines employs a primitive blocking and signaling system, and only the most important lines between the USSR and her satellites and the lines between the large industrial centers are modernly equipped. Single track lines predominate. There seems to be a marked tendency toward electrification of lines near the big centers, such as Moscow, Leningrad, and the industrial regions of Donbass, Urals, and Kuzbass.
Soviet Poster Collection

1. Bread is our wealth. Don’t waste bread!
   by Dr. James Nelson.
   Score: 0.398

2. Missile Forces and Artillery Day
   by Dr. James Nelson.
   Score: 0.398
Marshall Center Research Publications—Some in CGP at SuDoc D 1.111
The Marshall Center conducts research and policy analysis excellence for three reasons.

• First, professional participants need an evidence-based, research-led teaching approach that addresses real-world challenges. Research and policy analysis provide timely insights into pressing security concerns and challenges with the goal of building the capacity of U.S. and German friends and allies to respond to, manage, and mitigate sources of insecurity.

• Second, research and policy analysis—disseminated through bespoke Marshall Center publication platforms, peer-reviewed academic and other external policy journals, as well as in oral briefings to senior leaders—strengthens our alumni and wider networks and thus builds intellectual interoperability, shared understanding, and cognitive resilience in the face of regional and global uncertainties.

• Third, the Marshall Center recognizes the ethical duty of a publicly-funded educational institution to produce timely, policy-relevant research and analysis that serves the needs of our own governments and partners, as well as to curate, package, and transfer already existing knowledge and best practices to our course and event participants as well as our alumni through our courses and programs.
Marshall Center Security Insights provide short analytical articles that identify, explain, and put into context significant emerging and current defense and security issues. The series is aimed at the needs of political decision makers and others who are looking for concise summaries and analyses of important contemporary security topics. The Marshall Center Security Insights are generally authored by Marshall Center faculty and staff.
Cooperation or Confrontation in the European High North?

By CDR Rachael Gosnell and Dr. Katrin Bastian

There is no doubt that the old adage ‘High North, Low Tension’ is becoming outdated in a region that is increasingly witnessing militarization and strategic competition. Rising levels of commercial and military activity are intersecting with geopolitical, climate, economic, and security trends, portending emerging challenges for a region that has largely experienced cooperation for decades. The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies recently hosted the fourth European Security Seminar – North (ESS-N) program, bringing together more than 50 speakers and participants representing 13 nations – including all eight Arctic states – for discussions around the central theme of cooperation or conflict. Throughout the week, regional security professionals, scholars, and policymakers examined the security challenges and future prospects of the region. Evaluating the potential for cooperation or conflict in the European High North, the seminar focused on geostrategic competition in the region, with a particular emphasis on the dangers of an emerging Arctic security dilemma on NATO’s Northern Flank. This year’s ESS-N offered security
U.S. Security Strategy in the European High North

Figure 3. Sample of Arctic region military facilities. Source: U.S. Department of the Air Force
Top 10 Ways to Reduce Arctic Tensions

1) Enhance Constructive Dialogue
2) Utilize Clear Signaling
3) Strengthen Existing Fora
4) Normalize Presence
5) Understand the Role of Deterrence
6) Understand the Status Quo
7) Improve Maritime Domain Awareness
8) Create New Mechanisms for Dialogue
9) Understand Geopolitical Limitations
10) Cooperate Where Possible, Deter Where Necessary
Perspectives

Marshall Center Perspectives are short papers that document lessons learned, offer new insights, and present policy recommendations that have been developed in collaboration with our resident course and outreach event participants as well as our alumni.
Putin's Dollar Gambit

By Westin Reuter

Introduction

On the surface, the West’s sanctions appear to be crippling the Russian economy and the ability of Putin to wage war in Ukraine. Although it was an almost predetermined certainty that the West would place sanctions on Russia pending an invasion of Ukraine, we must now determine what strategic options remain for Putin. There are reasonable assumptions which must be respected within the analysis of this conflict: Putin has proven himself to be a cunning and capable strategist in the past, and Putin predicted the West to place sanctions on Russia. However, could these sanctions be more devastating than he predicted? And, does he really not have a plan to counter this move? Economically, it now appears nearly suicidal for Putin to continue his campaign in Ukraine. Could there be something missing from the current mainstream assessment? Could Putin have a strategy to use the current sanctions and Western response to his advantage?

With the ongoing complexity of the war in Ukraine and the tragedy that is now certain for both Ukrainian and Russian civilian populations, geopolitically there are only several perceivable
The Weaponized Dollar

One of the most transparent tools of governance the U.S. Dollar provides is through sanctions. Sanctions are economic restrictions (i.e., punishments) made possible due to the status of the U.S. Dollar as the world’s reserve currency. Since the U.S. Dollar is used as the primary trading currency of all nations worldwide (global reserve currency), the U.S. can block payments routed through the U.S. banking system and partner systems and also freeze assets in a variety of different methods. In this way, the U.S. does not have to take kinetic action directly against Russia at all, but merely compel some of Russia’s largest trading partners to scale down or cancel purchases of Russian exports. This tactic in combination with seizing or freezing Russian assets held within the U.S. banking system essentially creates an economic siege of Russia. Due to the interdependence of the global economy, this act would severely limit Russia’s ability to wage war by decreasing their opportunity to buy and sell fuel, food, and any other required material that is not produced on Russian soil. Sanctions not only decrease the opportunity to trade, but also decrease the purchasing power of the Ruble, making it more costly to buy items in the limited markets that are still available. In summary, sanctions levied by the U.S. Dollar in a globally connected economy limit what Russia can purchase, and how much they can purchase.
Putin’s Gambit

“There is a widespread assumption that the West is playing from financial strength into Russian weakness. This is not so. The Western economic system is in a deepening crisis of its own. Accelerated currency debasement is feeding into rising prices as purchasing powers decline. At the same time, the artificial economic boost from economic and currency interventions is fading. Some say its stagflation. But a better description is that the West’s problems stem from monetary inflation and increasing market awareness of the hidden taxation by negative real yields on government bonds. Central banks have enough of a dilemma dealing with the fall-out from their monetary policies without seeing an acceleration of financial hostilities against anyone.”

- Alasdair Macleod, Economist

A Gambit is an opening move in Chess in which a player risks one or more pawns or a minor piece in order to gain an advantage in position. Sanctions from the U.S. dollar on a peer competitor will not be the same as on a backwater country such as Afghanistan, Iran, or North Korea. Within the global interconnected economy, such a global supply disruption from a country as large as Russia, which produces significant amounts of the worlds required commodities, will cause pain within the western world as well. We can hope that western leaders understand this and have calculated the risk to reward ratio of this gambit. However, with the U.S. and European Stock Markets in decline, as well as a U.S. and Euro Dollar inflation rate at the highest in 30 years, there is a significantly increased risk of currency/economic failure at this time. This could be a main driver in Putin’s calculus to invade Ukraine at this specific time. Perhaps the war in Ukraine could solve two problems for Putin at the same time. First, it could secure Russia’s border and stop the progress eastward of NATO and Western Institutions. Second, it could serve as an opportunity to force developing nations playing the middle ground to choose sides within the coming and inevitable confrontation of the East and West. If Putin can force the U.S. and its institutions to overstep and subvert the autonomy of other nations through sanctions, some of these nations may see a chance to break from U.S. Dollar hegemony. Nations like Russia and China wishing to uphold their autocracies and dictatorships have witnessed the U.S. led assassinations of Saddam, Gaddafi, and Soleimani. The east may feel this is their best, or only chance at survival. The west and its institutions need to be aware of this. Publicly, at least, they do not appear to grasp the severity of the situation.
The *Marshall Center Occasional Papers* are a series of monographs covering a wide range of political-military issues, with a strong emphasis on topics covered in the resident courses and outreach events hosted by the Marshall Center. These papers offer analysis of key contemporary defense and security topics of interest to our stakeholders and international partners. *Occasional Papers* are written by Marshall Center faculty, Marshall Center alumni, and invited scholars and security experts.
The COVID-19 Pandemic: A Preliminary Assessment of the Impact on Terrorism in Western States

James K. Wither

Executive Summary

- The paper analyzes the terrorism threat against western states during the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic and, in particular, whether the crisis has created particular vulnerabilities that terrorists could exploit both to mount attacks and attract new recruits. The paper also explores the extent to which the pandemic might make western societies more vulnerable to terrorism in the longer term.
- Salafi-jihadist and far-right extremists have greeted the COVID-19 crisis with enthusiasm, viewing its impact on the West as both vindicating and advancing their ideologies and objectives. However, despite the calls for attacks on social media, the pandemic’s lockdowns, increased surveillance, travel restrictions, and the heavy police and military presence on the ground have created a challenging environment for terrorist operations.
- The security services have been drawn directly into the campaign against the coronavirus. This has diverted resources and assets away from counterterrorism duties in the short term, which might create potential opportunities for terrorists. As a result of the pandemic, governments will need to review national security priorities in the longer term. This is likely to result in a much greater emphasis on domestic and international public health issues. Counterterrorism may not retain its post 9/11 position in the hierarchy of western national security priorities.

Introduction

It is already a truism to state that the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic will have considerable impacts not only on health but also on the global economy. The health of the global economy, in turn, has implications for international terrorism, where both health and economic crises can either feed into or be used as a cover for terrorist activities.
Terrorist groups are well aware that millions of people are largely confined to their homes and consequently spending more time on the internet and social media. It has been common practice for jihadist groups to claim that any natural disaster in enemy states is God’s will and provides an opportunity to mount attacks. Consequently, both al Qaeda and IS have stepped up their propaganda, including apocalyptic YouTube videos that variously blame Jews and America for COVID-19. But while both groups claim that the virus manifests God’s anger against the West, their messaging has been noticeably different. Al Qaeda’s propaganda wing As-Sahab has highlighted the damage inflicted on the U.S. economy, a long-term campaign objective promoted
Bio Terror

The pandemic has raised the specter of bio-terrorism, using COVID-19 as a biological weapon (BW). In a speech to the Security Council, Secretary General António Guterres singled out the coronavirus bio-terrorism threat, warning that “Non-state groups could gain access to virulent strains that could pose similar devastation to societies around the globe.” Many terrorist groups have aspired to use BWs, but historically these have proved very difficult for terrorists to weaponize. BW dispersal is difficult and unpredictable. The heat from an improvised explosive device designed to disperse the agent would kill most of the organisms, while wind or rain can significantly degrade their effects. The wealthy Japanese cult group Aum Shinrikyo spent a small fortune trying to create a BW in the 1990s, but failed.

During the Ebola crisis in Africa in 2014, there were reports that IS had tried to use Ebola-infected individuals as delivery systems for the virus, but there is no hard evidence that this was actually attempted. However, right-wing extremists see potential to use the corona virus in a
The Marshall Center’s quarterly journal, *per Concordiam*, covers European and Eurasian security and defense issues. The articles featured in *per Concordiam* are written by resident course graduates and representatives of the organizations in which they work today. The editors of *per Concordiam*, an internationally distributed journal, also invite outside contributors to comment on key European and Eurasian security and defense issues; these contributors include scholars, policy-makers, and practitioners.
Published Since 2010
CONCORDIAM

Journal of European Security and Defense Issues

- MOSCOW’S MOTIVES IN BELARUS
  The Kremlin looks to advance its own interests

- THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT
  Reasserting influence in the post-Soviet space

- AWASH IN RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION
  Developing a strategy to stem the flow

PLUS

- WILL THERE BE A NEW COLD WAR?
  Predicting the future of U.S.-Russia relations

- How to counter a Sino-Russian alignment
  The Kremlin’s space program looks beyond the U.S.
  Proxy forces and the contemporary battlespace
FIGHTING RUSSIAN LIES
DISINFORMATION IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE
SEVERAL FACTORS MAKE SOUTHEAST EUROPE PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE TO SUCH MANIPULATIVE MESSAGES.

Disinformation through these channels seeks to exploit grievances, emotions and problems to fuel regional tensions and undermine support for Euro-Atlantic integration. A standard pattern combines fictitious arguments with factual reporting to create seemingly valid stories. Some common narratives spread in this regard are: (1) EU or U.S. support for regional pro-Western politicians is the cause of democratic deficits, economic problems, ethnic divisions, state failure and corruption; (2) the West is weak, divided and afraid of Russia; the EU and NATO are nearing collapse and will never accept more Balkan states as members; (3) the surge of migrants, 5G and COVID-19 are Western conspiracies; and (4) Russia is the sole defender of Orthodox Slavs (and sometimes others) against “enemies” old and new.

REGIONAL CASES
Several factors make Southeast Europe particularly vulnerable to such manipulative messages. The still-fragile regional political situation presents a fertile environment that continuously offers new material for disinformation. The region’s relatively short experience with democracy overlaps with low media literacy and lack of a strong tradition of objective professional journalism. Weak financial situations at local media outlets encourage uncritical acceptance of free pro-Russian content. Meanwhile, estimates that roughly three-quarters of regional populations use the internet and half use Facebook mean high potential exposure to online disinformation.

The following cases illustrate ways Russia takes advantage of such factors to tailor influence efforts to conditions in different countries.
The overall context of Russo-Serbian relations is shaped by the centuries-old narrative of Slavic brotherhood built around the premise of Russia as the protector of Serbian interests. Indeed, the “brotherhood” paradigm remains the foundation of Russian information operations in Serbia. Over the past two decades, the Kosovo conflict has further cemented ties as Moscow’s opposition to Kosovo’s declared independence has increased its importance as an ally. Consequently, various Serbian administrations have assumed an indifferent stance to pro-Russian influence operations and have sometimes even tried to instrumentalize these for their own political benefit. Similarly, most political parties in Serbia express neutral or positive attitudes toward Russia, and public opinion surveys consistently indicate that a large majority of Serbian citizens view Russia as a friendly country. Russia also enjoys positive coverage in Serbian media.

In terms of architecture, Sputnik Serbia represents a key hub for content creation and dissemination. According to Gemius ratings from early 2020, Sputnik Serbia on its own reaches only about a half million real users, making it the 31st most-read media portal in Serbia. However, due to its free, professionally packaged content, it receives strong amplification through republication by higher-ranked portals, including Informer, Vecernje Novosti, Srbija Danas and Alo! Each of which has more than 2 million users. Sputnik-produced content is also recirculated through pro-Russian niche portals such as Vostok, Fakti, Kremlin.rs, Srbinfo, Veseljenska and Srbija.net. This symbiotic relationship is symbiotic in nature that allows it to maintain a greater audience reach.

Russia and Serbian soldiers parade before a joint exercise in Deliblatska Pesca, northwest of Belgrade, in May 2021, at the same time U.S.-led forces held drills in neighboring nations. The Associated Press

for an asymmetrically strong presence of unreliable, Kremlin-skewed content within Serbia’s online community.

While offensive Russian information operations have been frequently studied, a recent case offered a glimpse of a defensive campaign aimed at damage control. In November 2019, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić revealed that his country’s security services had discovered a Russian attempt to infiltrate the Serbian Army. An anonymous YouTube video depicted what appeared to be an exchange of money for information between a retired Serbian serviceman and the assistant defense attaché at the Russian Embassy in Belgrade. The story and video received extensive media coverage, including on national primetime newscasts.

Initial Russian reactions appeared unsynchronized. Russia’s presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov simply maintained that further investigation was required while Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova immediately qualified the incident as “a provocation.” Within 24 hours, Sputnik started pushing the narrative of a Western-organized provocation aimed at disrupting Russian-Serbian relations and an upcoming meeting between the countries’ presidents. This storyline was aggressively pursued over the following month, with blame attributed to NATO and its regional proxies. The narrative, in turn, spread through Sputnik channels.
Montenegrin honor guards mark Montenegro’s accession to NATO — in spite of Russian opposition — in Podgorica in June 2017. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
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Chapter 7

Russia and Northeast Asia: Unrealized Potential

By Wade Turvold, Michael B. Dorschner, and Michael Burgoyne

Introduction

Russia’s global interests include sustaining the current regime, developing its economy, and resisting and reforming the U.S.-led international system to establish Russia as one of several global powers. Russia’s objectives in Northeast Asia that nest within its global ambitions primarily include expansion of economic relationships as part of its “Turn to the East” policy. Russia’s economic relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) currently dwarfs those with the rest of Northeast Asia, and the “Turn to the East” policy would optimally enhance these relationships in an effort to meaningfully diversify its economic ties. Russia’s strategy in Northeast Asia is therefore coherent with its international goals, but more nuanced because of Russia’s strategic partnership with the PRC, and because of the unique economic potential of the region. This chapter will address Russia’s interactions with the Republic of Korea (Korea), Taiwan, Mongolia, and Japan. It will also complement the Russia-PRC chapter in this book by showing how the Russia-PRC relationship enables and constrains Russia’s role in Northeast Asia.
Chapter 14

Active Measures: Russia’s Covert Global Reach

By Mark Galeotti

Introduction
Aktivnye meropriyatiya, “active measures,” are covert and deniable political influence and subversion operations, from corruption and disinformation through to outright assassination and even sponsorship of coups.\(^1\) They have a long and inglorious tradition in Russian foreign operations and reflect a permanent wartime mentality, something dating back to the Soviet era and even Tsarist Russia.\(^2\) The term was used by the Soviet Union (USSR) from the 1950s onward to describe the gamut of operations, often carried out through front organizations, and frequently entailing the spread of disinformation. Indeed, the Committee for State Security (KGB)’s Service A, its primary active measures department, was originally Service D, meaning disinformation.

In many ways, active measures reflect the wartime mentality of the Soviet leadership, as similar tactics were used by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) during the Second World War, but much less frequently thereafter. For the KGB, however, active measures increasingly became central to its mission abroad in the postwar period, something made explicit by then–KGB chair Yuri Andropov in his Directive No. 0066 of 1982.\(^3\) Tellingly, the KGB’s official definition of “intelligence” was
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By Pavel Baev, Dmitry Gorenburg, and Graeme P. Herd
Russia and Ukraine: Negotiated Settlement and End State?

Pavel Baev, Mark Galeotti, and Graeme P. Herd

March 2022, Number 1

Context

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine appears stalled, giving space for political negotiations. However, there are two wars that need to be addressed: Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and Russia’s war with the West. In the first war, the issues include: 1) “neutrality”; 2) “security guarantees”; 3) de-militarization; 4) “de-nazification”; and 5) the nature of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Russia’s combat operations have stalled. Forceful breakthrough in several directions are unsuccessful. The siege of Kyiv incomplete, as the visit by three European prime ministers demonstrated. On 21 March President Zelensky stated that Ukraine will not bow to ultimatums from Russia and that Ukrainian cities under attack will not accept occupation. At the same time he urged direct talks with President Putin, saying: “Without this meeting it is impossible to fully understand what they are ready for in order to stop the war.” As a Ukrainian Jew whose relatives died in the Holocaust, his address to the Israeli Knesset compared Russian actions with that of the Nazi’s. Russian propaganda asserting the opposite fails to gain traction outside of Russia.
Deficiencies in Russia’s way of war are evident. The Russian military was unprepared for a multi-axis attack against determined resistance. The centrality of Putin to Putin’s war is highlighted by his portrayal as a popular war leader, though this popularity may be Potemkin-like. Putin is selling “victory” to the Russian public and his “inner circle,” but are they buying? If so, at what price? Putin sought to restore Slavic unity. He breaks it, loses Ukraine and returns Russia to a 1970s “Brezhnev 2.0” construct, with differences: Russia is in open confrontation with the West not competition, is more ideological, weaker and less stable. Coups in Russia – Khrushchev in 1964 or Gorbachev in August 1991 – occur when there is a confluence of opinion in Russian military, KGB and political elites. Has Putin ensured through elite surveillance and a lack of collective institutions that this terminal culmination point is not reached? For now elite opposition manifests itself as passivity and lack of support rather than the active determination to be first mover in the removal of a paranoid and isolated but not yet a fully Potemkin-Putin: “Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown.” (King Richard IV, Part 2, Act 3, Scene 1).

GCMC, March 22, 2022.
Russia-China Axis: Polar Power-Plays?

By Pavel Baev, Elizabeth Buchanan, and Graeme P. Herd

Countering Chinese and Russian Narratives

By Hannes Adomeit, Falk Tettweller, and Graeme P. Herd
Countering Chinese and Russian Narratives

Hannes Adomeit, Falk Tettweiler, and Graeme P. Herd

February 2022, Number 02

Introduction

“Narrative” is a neutral term. A political and strategic narrative is “a means by which political actors attempt to construct a shared meaning of the past, present, and future to shape the behavior of domestic and international actors.” A narrative consists of a sequence of causally related events and their structural features include characters/actors, scene/setting, obstacle/puzzle to overcome, tools to achieve this end and desired or feared end-states. Three types of interwoven narratives can be identified:

- **Identity narratives** are narratives about an actor, the factors that constrain and define their actions, character and ideas, how the actors will behave in the future and who is considered friend, enemy, small power, great power, etc.
- **Policy narratives** advance normative or interest-based agendas.
- **System narratives** focus on the economic or political systems actors inhabit, such as liberal world order, bi-polar order, polycentric order, etc.

Narratives evoke emotions, shared identity, and are tailored to specific audiences. Successful narratives are supported by coherent actions, strategic communication, and control of the narrative, multipliers, and interpretive predominance. Narrative can both foster cooperation or confrontation depending on the willingness of the actors to align in constructing shared meaning or not. An example of the former would be: “direct, open and-alliances are a good kind that are made being correctly carried.”
Russia’s Global Order Narrative

“Russia’s” world view and strategic outlook places itself in relation to other states in a new global order. This has implications for resilient democratic counter narratives. In a narrow sense, “narrative” refers to what the Kremlin says, but says nothing about what the people in the Kremlin think. A sharp distinction needs to be drawn between genuine cognitive and instrumental perceptions, that is, between what decision-makers really think (deeds as “revealed preference”), and what they claim, what they profess to think, so as to influence domestic and foreign audiences (which can constitute “rhetorical camouflage”).

A second clarification concerns the question as to what it is that is meant when we say: “Russia thinks,” or when we try to fathom “Russia’s strategic interests.” Essentially, we are talking about what “Putin” thinks. This is increasingly analytically correct, indeed, the system he has built has aptly been called the “Putin System.” It is autocratic, authoritarian and increasingly centralized, that is, it is based on the “vertical of power” (vertikal’ vlasti). Decisions of any significance in domestic or foreign policy cannot be made without participation and consent of the Kremlin’s chief. That applies even more so to the formulation of basic foreign policy directions.
The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Narrative

The CCP has a long history in constructing its (and a Chinese) narrative. The CCP’s narrative depicts a cooperative approach to adapting/transforming the world order; the West could use this narrative to reduce tensions. The CCP exercises control over its narrative using open and covert means.

• The CCP’s leadership has strongly controlled its narrative for decades. Even before gaining total control over mainland China, Mao was convincingly promoting his narrative of the peoples struggle for liberation, the present and future to Western journalists and Soviet officials.

• The active work on CCP’s and China’s history was institutionalized with the first so-called “Resolution on History” by Mao in 1945 (7th plenary session of the 6th Central Committee), followed by Deng in 1981 (6th plenary session of 11th Central Committee) and most recently by Xi in November 2021 (6th plenary session of 19th Central Committee). The CCP uses this narrative to demonstrate and cement its legitimacy to rule. As such, the narrative is preface to the Chinese Constitution and every report to the CCP Congresses.

• Every resolution represents a new era in Chinese history (standing up, getting rich, and getting strong). The three iconic figures Mao, Deng, and Xi have “liberated” political space for the future development of China by establishing rule/dictatorship of the Chinese people (i.e. communist revolution), opening China and hence enabling economic growth, eradicating societal differences in wealth and opportunity and leading China on its path to its natural status as a Great Power.
Conclusions: China and Russia’s Respective Roles in the New Order?

Ideologies consist of clusters of ideas that link problems, to blame and point to solutions. Both Russia and China advance identity, policy and systems narratives in terms of apportioning “blame,” Russia and China are aligned – the U.S. and its allies are to blame. However, both China and Russia identify different problems and posit different solutions. Thus, there are points of convergence as well as competition between Russian and Chinese narratives.

China works with the current international order where it appears to serve its interests, and circumvents it where it believes that it does not. Despite the mean China uses to propagate its narrative, the narrative itself is cooperative in its nature. Russia’s narrative stresses the need for confrontation with the “totalitarian West.” Russia actively strives to destroy the Western, rule-based system. It now rejects the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe as an essentially anti-Russian project. Currently China views the uneven distribution of wealth within China as the primary contradiction to be overcome (in accordance with the logic of dialectical materialism), Russia views the uneven distribution of power in the international system as the core problem, and either a new Cold War or Global Concert of Great Powers as the solution. In contrast to the Soviet era, however, Russia does not have a missionary purpose and it does not advance a counter or alternative system. Unlike China, Russia lacks its own compelling vision of the future, a developmental or modernization paradigm.

Russia stresses friendship and cooperation with China, but a Russian critique of the Chinese system of governance appears taboo. China, though, views the collapse of the Soviet Union that saw the emergence of the Russia Federation as an object lesson in what not to do. Understanding the linkages between Russia and Chinese narratives helps develop resilient democratic counter narratives. It also can identify potential fracture points between Chinese and Russian narratives – whether that be over a Ukraine invasion by Russia or Taiwan by China, competing interests in the Arctic or contestation of the Eurasian shared neighbourhood.

GCMC, February 16, 2022.
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Questions?