ENHANCING YOUR INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INFORMATION RESOURCE IQ

PART 2: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Professor Bert Chapman
Purdue University Libraries
June 12, 2018
1949 Central Intelligence Agency Act P.L. 81-110
Selected statutory coverage 50 USC 3501-3524, 3024, 3036, 3094
July 11, 1941 Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) established
June 13, 1942 Office of Strategic Services (OSS) established

October 1, 1945-Strategic Services Unit (SSU) established.
January 1946-Central Intelligence Group (CIG) established
September 18, 1947 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) established
CIA MISSION, VISION, & ETHOS

- **Mission:** Preempt threats and further US national security objectives by collecting intelligence that matters, producing help keep objective all-source analysis, conducting effective covert action as directed by the President, and safeguarding the secrets that r Nation safe.

- **Vision:** Institutional insights, information, and actions consistently provide tactical and strategic advantage for the U.S.

- **Ethos:** Service: We put Nation first, Agency before unit, and mission before self. We take pride in being diverse, inclusive, agile, responsive, and consequential.

- **Integrity:** We uphold the highest standards of lawful conduct. We are truthful and forthright, and we provide information and analysis without institutional or political bias. We maintain the Nation’s trust through accountability and oversight.

- **Excellence:** We bring the best of our diverse backgrounds and expertise to everything we do. We are self-aware, reflecting on our performance and learning from it. We strive to give all officers the tools, experiences, and leadership they need to excel.

- **Courage:** We accomplish difficult, high-stakes, often dangerous tasks. In executing mission, we carefully manage risk but we do not shy away from it. We value sacrifice and honor our fallen.

- **Teamwork:** We stand by and behind one another. Collaboration, both internal and external, underpins our best outcomes.

- **Stewardship:** We preserve our ability to obtain secrets by protecting sources and methods from the moment we enter on duty until our last breath.
KEY CHALLENGES

• Close intelligence gaps with enhanced collection and analysis on the countries, non-state actors, and issues most critical to the President and senior national security team.

• Fulfill our global mission to give customers decision advantage as they confront an unprecedented volume and diversity of worldwide developments that affect US interests.

• Leverage technological advances for better performance in all mission areas—collection, analysis, covert action, and counterintelligence—while protecting against technological threats to the security of our information, operations, and officers.

• Improve the ways we attract, develop, and retain talent to maximize each CIA officer’s potential to contribute to achieving mission.

• Better manage Agency resources during a period of fiscal austerity.

• 32 individuals have served as CIA Director or Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)-32 with Gina Haspel’s confirmation. Examples of selected Directors:
  • Roscoe Hillenkoetter 1947-1950
  • Allen Dulles 1953-1961
  • William Colby 1973-1976
  • Stansfield Turner 1977-1981
  • William Casey 1981-1987
  • Robert Gates 1991-1993
  • George Tenet 1996-2004
  • Michael Hayden 2006-2009
  • John Brennan 2013-2017
CURRENT CIA DIRECTOR GINA HASPEL (2018-)
CIA ORGANIZATIONAL COMPONENTS

• **Directorate of Analysis**—Where incomplete and sometimes contradictory information is transformed into unique insights that inform US policy decisions. The DA helps provide timely, accurate, and objective all-source intelligence analysis on national security and foreign policy issues to senior policymakers in the US government. Prepares *President’s Daily Brief* (PDB)-containing highest level intelligence analysis for President, Vice-President, and select presidentially designated cabinet level officials featuring highest level intelligence analysis and *World Intelligence Review* (WIRE) directed to senior policy and military officials with many of its items directed to major U.S. military commands e.g. NORTHCOM.

• **Directorate of Operations**—Strengthening national security objectives & foreign policy objectives via human intelligence and covert action

• **Directorate of Science & Technology**—Attacking national intelligence problems with effective targeting, bold technology, and superlative tradecraft. Collaborates with intelligence community, military, academia, national laboratories, and private sector.
**CIA ORGANIZATIONAL COMPONENTS**

- **Directorate of Support** - Often among the first CIA officers into difficult operational areas. We are responsible for getting key support functions — to include security, supply chains, facilities, financial and medical services, business systems, human resources, logistics and others — up and running. We are present throughout operations, providing ongoing support for each mission component. And, at the end of the operation, we ensure that people and equipment get out safely.

- **Directorate of Digital Innovation** - Focused on accelerating innovation across the Agency’s mission activities with cutting-edge digital and cyber tradecraft and IT infrastructure. The DDI is the engine of creativity, integration, and rigor that CIA needs in the digital age, ensuring that our culture, tradecraft, and knowledge management across the board are more than equal to the challenges and opportunities of the rapidly changing world in which we operate. Providing officers with the tools and techniques they need to excel and prevail in the cyber and big data arenas to optimizing our business operations.

- **Mission Centers** - Work closely with all Agency elements to help meet current and future national security challenges. Centers serve as locations to integrate capabilities and bring the full range of CIA’s operational, analytic, support, technical and digital skillsets to bear against the nation’s most pressing national security problems. Not restricted to any single directorate work with ALL CIA elements to enhance integration and interoperability.

- **Offices of the Director** - Featuring staff personnel covering public affairs, human resources, protocol, congressional affairs, legal issues, information management, internal oversight, military affairs, and talent center of excellence.
CIA DIRECTOR SPEECHES & TESTIMONY 1995-PRESENT

- October 12, 2017 - Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Central Intelligence Agency Director Mike Pompeo at the University of Texas Annual National Security Forum (October 12, 2017)

- October 4, 2017 - Remarks as prepared for delivery by Central Intelligence Agency Director Mike Pompeo at the Conference on the Ethos and Profession of Intelligence at George Washington University

- July 11, 2017 - Director Pompeo Delivers Remarks at INSA

- June 16, 2017 - Remarks by CIA Director Mike Pompeo at the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 75th Anniversary Ceremony (June 16, 2017)

- April 13, 2017 - Director Pompeo Delivers Remarks at CSIS (April 13, 2017)

- September 27, 2016 - CIA Director John Brennan Speaks at the 9/11 Memorial Museum in New York City (September 26, 2016)

- September 15, 2016 - Director Brennan Delivers Keynote Address at Miles College National Security Colloquium in Birmingham, Alabama (September 13, 2016)
Career Opportunities

The CIA is the premier agency responsible for providing global intelligence on the ever-changing political, social, economic, technological and military environment. Here, your paramount goal and mission will be to protect the national security of the United States. Virtually any job you can imagine is available at the CIA — plus, some you can’t even imagine.

View our available career opportunities or learn about the application process by visiting the following pages:

- Browse Jobs by Category
- Student Opportunities
- Application Process
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<td>Transnational Issues</td>
<td>ESTONIA</td>
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Disputes - international:
Russia and Estonia in May 2005 signed a technical border agreement, but Russia in June 2005 recalled its signature after the Estonian parliament added to its domestic ratification act a historical preamble referencing the Soviet occupation and Estonia’s pre-war borders under the 1920 Treaty of Tartu; Russia contends that the preamble allows Estonia to make territorial claims on Russia in the future, while Estonian officials deny that the preamble has any legal impact on the treaty text; Russia demands better treatment of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia; as a member state that forms part of the EU’s external border, Estonia implements strict Schengen border rules with Russia.

Refugees and internally displaced persons:
**stateless persons:** 82,585 (2016); note - following independence in 1991, automatic citizenship was restricted to those who were Estonian citizens prior to the 1940 Soviet occupation and their descendants; thousands of ethnic Russians remained stateless when forced to choose between passing Estonian language and citizenship tests or applying for Russian citizenship; one reason for demurring on Estonian citizenship was to retain the right of visa-free travel to Russia; stateless residents can vote in local elections but not general elections; stateless parents who have been lawful residents of Estonia for at least five years can apply for citizenship for their children before they turn 15 years old.

Illicit drugs:
growing producer of synthetic drugs; increasingly important transshipment zone for cannabis, cocaine, opiates, and synthetic drugs since joining the European Union and the Schengen Accord; potential money laundering related to organized crime and drug trafficking is a concern, as is possible use of the gambling sector to launder funds; major use of opiates and ecstasy.
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<td>XI Jinping</td>
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<td>Vice Pres.</td>
<td>LI Yuanchao</td>
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<tr>
<td>Executive Vice Premier, State Council</td>
<td>ZHANG Gaoli</td>
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<td>Vice Premier, State Council</td>
<td>LIU Yandong</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vice Premier, State Council</td>
<td>WANG Yang</td>
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<td>MA Kai</td>
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<td>YANG Jing</td>
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<td>GUO Shengkun</td>
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<td>Chmn., Central Military Commission</td>
<td>XI Jinping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chmn., National Development &amp; Reform Commission</td>
<td>XU Shaoshi</td>
</tr>
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Kevin Davies holds a Master of Arts Degree in Defence Studies from the Australian Defence Force Academy.

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James Noone is a senior officer in the Defense Intelligence Agency. He is a former member of the Studies in Intelligence Editorial Board.

Jason Manosevitz is an analyst in CIA’s Directorate of Analysis. He is a member of the Studies in Intelligence Editorial Board.
The Role of Military Intelligence in the Battle for Beersheba in October 1917

James Noone

The Levantine coast is perhaps the most blood-drenched landscape in the world. Babylonians, Egyptians, Hittites, Greeks, Romans, Crusaders, Arabs, Philistines, Jews and many others have fought and died in this strategic crossroad between Asia, Europe, and Africa. Today’s ongoing crisis in the Levant eerily mirrors dozens of earlier conflicts, including the British World War I Levant Campaign fought 100 years ago.¹

In 1917, the teetering central government on the brink of collapse was that of the Ottoman Empire. Like today’s regime in Damascus, Istanbul’s government held on in large part due to military support from its powerful ally to the north, Germany. The Western Allies pressing on multiple fronts to defeat Germany and its allies in Central Europe then were seeking regime change on the southeastern
Intelligence in Public Media

Destination Casablanca: Exile, Espionage, and the Battle for North Africa in World War II
Meredith Hindley (Public Affairs, 2017). 491 pp., notes, bibliography, index, photographs.

Reviewed by Clayton Laurie

In Destination Casablanca, Meredith Hindley has produced something rare, a non-fiction book that can serve as a vital companion piece to a classic fiction movie—in this case, the Ingrid Bergman, Humphrey Bogart film of 1942, Casablanca. The book will enhance any viewer’s knowledge and understanding of the film and of history, and it will provide the modern-day intelligence officer with operational insights into tradecraft of 75 years ago that remain valid today.

Doubtless, many have asked when viewing Casablanca, as Hindley did, “What is going on at Rick’s Cafe Americain? What are letters of transit? Why so many refugees in Casablanca? What became of them, what lay behind the complex American-German-French relationships in North Africa, and how did they evolve and conclude? Are these events real?” This well written, usable, and thoroughly researched history answers all.

Events in Europe seemed far away until war erupted in 1939. What had been a trickle of refugees fleeing the Nazis became a flood in June 1940 with the fall of France. The establishment of the collaborationist Vichy French regime under Marshall Henri Petain significantly complicated matters as the defeated and much-weakened yet proud rump nation struggled to protect colonial holdings in Africa and Southeast Asia. The influx of tens of thousands of refugees, swelled the pre-war Casablanca population of 350,000 with men, women, and children of all means, ages, and nationalities, including Jews, escaped soldiers, and anti-Nazi resisters—all in need of safe haven, food, housing, and support while seeking letters of transit out of Morocco, first to Lisbon, and then the Americas.

Restrictive immigration policies of the day, however, required refugees to have sponsors in receiving nations before issuance of visas or letters of transit. These
• Contains National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) on historical topics such as countries and transnational subjects which may be relevant today.

• CREST: The CREST system is the publicly accessible repository of the subset of CIA records reviewed under the 25-year program in electronic format (manually reviewed and released records are accessioned directly into the National Archives in their original format). Over 11 million pages have been released in electronic format and reside on the CREST database, from which researchers have printed about 1.1 million pages. Previously, in order to directly access CREST, a researcher was required to visit the National Archives at College Park, Maryland. CIA recognized that such visits were inconvenient and presented an obstacle to many researchers. Therefore, in January 2017, the CIA published the records of the CREST collection online.

• Features translated material
• OSS Materials
• Terrorist Detention and Interrogation Materials
• Historical documents collections including:
  • Intelligence, Policy, and Politics: The DCI, the White House, and Congress
  • Baptism by Fire: CIA Analysis of the Korean War
  • Bay of Pigs Release
  • Berlin Wall Collection
  • Bin Laden Collection
  • What Was the Missile Gap?
  • Bosnia, Intelligence, and the Clinton Presidency
  • CIA Analysis of the Soviet Navy
  • Intelligence Warning of the 1957 Launch of Sputnik
...the letter to Waziristan, but it disappeared and we do not know what the reason was. Also, a testimony was requested from the brothers in Jalalabad, and this request was not complied with and they killed those brothers, and they were four with Abu Amamah, God have mercy on him. I did not mention this to justify what has happened, but we are in an Intelligence battle and humans are humans and no one is infallible. This matter happened to someone better than us, it happened to Khalid and to Usamah, May God be satisfied with them, and to his companion in the battle Uhud, when al-Yaman was killed. God said in His Book: "A believer will not kill another believer except if in error, and he said, you are not blamed for mistakes you committed but for what your hearts intended. And in the Prophet’s Hadith: God has allowed mistakes and forgetting for this nation. And in the story of Hatib, when a mistake was done but was irreligious, God said; O you who believe, do not betray God and the Prophet, and your faith. O you who believe, do not take a ruler as my enemy and yours. He did not mention that this person was hit by insanity and began to spy for the non-believers and spread the secret of the Prophet. He did not order his exile, but said, He (Allah) is the creator of the creatures, and he is knowledgeable of is in their hearts (O people who believe). And in the story about the Three who succeeded God’s Messenger, and they are the best people. Two of them had seen Badr and one was a witness to the al-‘Agabah pledge of allegiance. God be satisfied with them, he ordered their exile for fifty two days, the period of the battle of Tabuk, because it was in intention and laziness. At the end of their story God said: O who you believe, fear Allah and be truthful, and this happened to the jihadist group in Sudan, and the Islamic Libya group in Kabul.
Here, I tell the Muslims in Yemen that the reasons for a revolution and the factors for its success are available to you. One of the main reasons for a revolution in Islam is that it is a religious obligation. Scholars emphasized the importance of removing a leader who carries out deeds that are contrary to Islam. This is the common factor between you and all the Muslim people. You are not strangers to the repeated positions by ‘Ali ‘Abdallah Saleh which clearly show that he did things that are contrary to Islam for the past few decades, such as appeasing the infidels, providing for the American destroyers so they may continue their siege and kill our people in Iraq and Palestine, and conspire with the United States in the killing of Muslims in Yemen, including men, women, and children, for the goal of achieving the interests of the United States. He even assured the Americans that he would continue to support their operations that target Muslims.

[This is] a betrayal and collusion that are as visible as the sun in broad daylight. What adds to the visibility are the frequent visits by American administration officials to Yemen and his compliance with their request to stop the war against the Huthi, who are the real danger to the area, and to concentrate his efforts on targeting the free Mujahidin.

In addition to the aforementioned reasons, the biggest reason for revolutions is the regimes’ rampant financial and administrative corruption that led to an excess of injustice and poverty, and that is what the regime is doing there.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011800010
The President's Daily Brief
6 October 1973
4-5
25X1

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A011800010
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. l 1652
exemption category 513(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
The President's Daily Brief
LATE ITEM

Israel-Syria-Egypt: Early this morning information from "good sources" that Egypt and Syria are planning a coordinated attack across the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights before nightfall today. He said that a partial mobilization of the Israeli Defense Force is under way. We have no information that would confirm the Israeli reports of an imminent attack.
The dollar remained steady on money markets this week, but the European currency band is still vulnerable to a number of pressures. (Page 4)

Barring a weather disaster during the next three weeks, the Soviets are likely to harvest over 200 million tons of grain. (Page 5)

West Germany’s insistence that it has the right to represent Berlin’s institutions has caused a squabble within the ruling coalition. (Page 6)

The Khmer Communists now hold most of the defense line south of Phnom Penh. (Page 7)

There are notes on North Vietnamese inductions, Chinese road building in Laos, fedayeen, and Japanese moves to assure access to the world’s oil and mineral resources. (Page 8)
Syrian air activity appears to be normal. A number of reports that Damascus is redeploying its forces in the Golan Heights area

A military initiative at this time would make little sense for either Cairo or Damascus. Another round of hostilities would destroy Sadat's painstaking efforts to invigorate Egypt's economy and run counter to his attempts to bring the less militant, oil-rich states into a united Arab front. Syria's cautious President Asad appears braced for a possible second blow from Israel rather than seeking revenge for his recent loss of 13 MiGs to Israeli fighters. Damascus radiobroadcasts reflect Syrian fears.

The Israelis' attitude apparently has changed considerably since Monday when they, too, viewed the activity in Egypt as normal and that in Syria as defensive.

Nevertheless, the Syrians' fears could lead to a mobilization of their defenses, which in turn could alarm and galvanize the Israelis. Such a cycle of action and reaction would increase the risk of military clashes which neither side originally intended.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of NIE 11-8-68

SUBJECT: Extreme Sensitivity of NIE 11-8-68, "Soviet Strategic Attack Forces"

1. Dissemination of NIE 11-8-68 must be carefully limited because of the extreme sensitivity of the information therein.

2. In this connection, I wish to stress that there be absolutely no reproduction of this estimate, and that no revelation of its existence be made to unauthorized persons.

Richard Helms

## THE PROBLEM ................................................................. 1

## CONCLUSIONS .............................................................. 1

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<td>D. Future Force Levels and Composition</td>
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THE PROBLEM

To estimate the strength and capabilities of Soviet strategic attack forces through mid-1970 and to estimate general trends in those forces over the next 10 years.

CONCLUSIONS

A. The primary objectives of Soviet strategic policy have been to achieve a more formidable deterrent and to narrow and eventually to overcome the US lead in capabilities for intercontinental attack. Toward this end the Soviets have built strategic forces, both offensive and defensive, which provide a large assured destruction capability and important damage-limiting capabilities as well. While they have only begun to narrow the gap in submarine-launched ballistic missiles and remain inferior in heavy bombers, the Soviets will shortly overcome the US lead in numbers of ICBM launchers. Current programs will bring further improvements in the USSR's strategic position, already the most favorable of the postwar period. But the Soviets face in the future a strategic situation changed and complicated by projected improvements in US forces—Poseidon, Minuteman III, and the antiballistic missile system—that threaten to erode their relative position.

B. In deciding upon the future size and composition of their strategic forces the Soviets are almost certainly exploring a number of alternatives. They are evidently interested in strategic arms control as an option that could conserve economic resources and protect their improved strategic position. In the absence of an arms control agreement, we believe that they will continue the arms competition with the US, seeking to maintain and if possible improve their relative strategic position. In any case, they will probably give increased attention to
### ESTIMATED OPERATIONAL ICBM LAUNCHERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 September 1968</th>
<th>Mid-1969</th>
<th>Mid-1970</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Soft</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-7</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>128-142</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Hard (Triple Silo)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-7</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>69</td>
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<tr>
<td>SS-8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
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<td>69-76</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Hard (Single Silo)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Largo (SS-9)</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>158-222</td>
<td>228-240</td>
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<tr>
<td>Small (SS-11)</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>620-630</td>
<td>630-720</td>
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<td>Small (SS-13)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0-20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>818-832</td>
<td>838-1,010</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>898</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,038-1,112</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,138-1,230</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The silos in the triple silo sites are so close to each other that they represent one aiming point per site. Single silos are located at least 3 miles apart and represent separate aiming points. We believe that all hardened ICBM launchers deployed in the field are designed to remain completely operable when exposed to overpressures on the order of 200-400 psi.*

*b It is possible that the Soviets could fit SS-9 and SS-11 silos for emergency launch at some stage in the fitting out period after they are externally complete. In the case of the SS-11, the launch control facility for the group would have to be complete and operational. Such a procedure would provide a launch capability up to three months earlier than otherwise. We think it unlikely they would do this unless they foresaw a crisis situation in that period.*

*c In addition to the ICBM launchers shown above, each SS-9 and SS-11 complex contains 1 additional silo and control facility in the complex. These sites are believed to be crew training facilities. There are now 6 such sites at the SS-9 complexes and 9 at SS-11 complexes with 1 additional SS-9 site under construction. The total of 68 SS-9, 8 SS-11 silos deployed in the field.”*
North Korea: Likely Response to Economic Sanctions

Information available as of 10 December 1991 was used in the preparation of this Memorandum, which was requested by the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. It was prepared by the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia and coordinated with representatives of CIA, NSA, the Department of State, DIA and the military services. Comments can be directed to the NIO for East Asia.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 06-May-2009
Key Judgments

The Intelligence Community believes that economic sanctions per se would not cause North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program. If Pyongyang had not already signed a safeguards agreement, it might respond to sanctions by agreeing to fulfill some of its NPT commitments, but only to split an international coalition backing sanctions.

Foreign trade plays an important role in key sectors of North Korea's economy. Pyongyang imports all of its crude oil, coking coal, and advanced technology, and 25 percent of its needed food grains. It exports military equipment to a number of Middle Eastern countries.

A trade embargo—if fully respected and enforced—would cause a significant falloff in production and impose severe hardships on the North Korean populace. A curtailment of crude oil shipments would be particularly troublesome and would lead to industrial shutdowns, restricted transportation, and reduced agriculture and fishing.

Most of the North's trading partners would be reluctant to impose, much less to enforce, economic sanctions. China's role would be key, and we believe Beijing would strenuously oppose—and assist Pyongyang in evading—an embargo.

With imposition of an embargo, at minimum the regime would place its forces on alert, increase austerity measures, and undertake efforts to subvert and evade the sanctions. It might stage incidents along the Demilitarized Zone. It is possible, though not likely, it could resort to a military attack on the South, if Pyongyang perceived sanctions threatened its basic survival.
planned switch from barter to hard currency trade because of Pyongyang’s economic woes.

Japan is a major source of capital goods, dual-use vehicles, semi-finished manufactures, and electronic components. In addition to this legal trade, pro-Pyongyang Korean residents in Japan provide the North with COCOM-controlled equipment. Pyongyang has a trade surplus with Japan, and uses excess foreign exchange to purchase needed goods from elsewhere.

Arms sales—principally to the Middle East—also brought in nearly $200 million in needed foreign currency in 1990 (see table 3). In the last year, Pyongyang has established firm partnerships to trade weapons for petroleum. For example, the North purchased 600,000 tons of Iranian crude this year by drawing against credits from the sale of Scud missiles and equipment to Tehran.

Impact of an Embargo

A trade embargo—if fully respected—would compound the problems plaguing the North Korean economy and would impose severe hardships on the North Korean populace. The reduction of crude oil would be particularly troublesome. Shortages of gasoline, diesel fuel, and lubricants are already chronic, slowing production and transportation throughout the economy.

The cutoff of oil deliveries would probably cause the regime to accelerate the shutdown of even essential industries and move to inefficient alternative forms of transportation—ox carts, bicycles, and charcoal-burning vehicles. Fertilizer and pesticide production would be cut, adversely affecting the agricultural sector. Fuel shortages also would hamper the fishing industry.

The reduction of grain imports eventually would prove serious. Pyongyang has suffered grain shortages for several years and has coped by reducing rations and encouraging citizens to eat only two meals a day, according to travelers and defectors. Even with an improved harvest this year, the North may need to import as much as half a million tons of grain just to keep the already reduced consumption levels from falling further. North Korea reportedly stores large supplies of food as military reserve stocks, but we are unable to quantify amounts.

North Korea’s Likely Reaction

If they had not already signed an IAEA safeguards agreement, Pyongyang might try to weaken the international community’s
OVERVIEW OF IRAN’S RENEWED EFFORTS FOR NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT

Summary

In 1982, the Islamic Government of Iran reversed its decision to abandon the Shah’s ambitious nuclear program. The direction of Iran’s current program suggests that Iran is attempting to implement plans organized under the Shah that included developing a nuclear fuel cycle to support a nuclear research and power reactor program. Iran is a party to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and there is no evidence that Iran is resuming nuclear research to develop nuclear weapons. Even if they were to renounce the NPT, we believe that Iran will not have the technology needed to recover plutonium for a nuclear weapon within at least the next ten years.

Background

The Government of Iran’s 1982 decision to reinstitute the Shah's nuclear program was in part due to the personal ambitions of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran's (AEOI) two principle leaders, Reza Amrollahi, Director General of the AEOI and Cyrus Amer-Tusi, Special Consultant. The decision was
Iran, however, is having and probably will continue to have chronic problems in obtaining enriched uranium fuel for its US-supplied research reactor at the NRC. Since early 1983, Iran has been trying to buy fuel for the reactor directly from West European supplier countries and through the IAEA. To date, Iran has not found a willing supplier. Iran probably will be forced to shut down the reactor if it does not obtain fuel by the end of this year. This will impede their progress in areas of reactor design and operation as well as training personnel.

Prospects for Nuclear Weapons

Iran has signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and we have no evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. We believe that Iran may at some future date be motivated to become a nuclear weapons power for reasons of prestige as well as regional security. However, Iran would need a reactor that could provide it with enough fissile material (i.e. plutonium) for a nuclear weapon and a reprocessing facility to separate the plutonium from spent reactor fuel. If the Bushehr-I reactor can be completed and operated, plutonium will be produced. The diversion of this plutonium however, would be a violation of international safeguards that apply to the reactor, even if Iran were to withdraw from the NPT. We speculate that Iran's indigenous reactor development effort could eventually lead to construction of a suitable plutonium production reactor, but not before the turn of the century. Even so, it will also be difficult for Iran to acquire the reprocessing technology necessary to recover any plutonium produced because of nuclear supplier controls that apply to the export of such technology. And we do not believe that Iran could indigenously develop this technology over the next ten years.
Memorandum to: Sol Bachusnau, Chairman
    Defense Science Board

From: Walter Orr Roberts

Subject: Key Issues of Interest to DOD in Weather and Climate Change

Introductory

The impact of changes of weather and climate is huge. Nearly every aspect of human life is affected. I am concerned that I have not seen more attention by DoD to the advancing front of knowledge of prediction and control of weather and climate, nor to the military consequences of probable future climate scenarios. This memo, thus, highlights a few of the key issues that I envision to be of great present and potential DoD significance.

As I mentioned at the meeting on 26 February, I will prepare a 30-minute briefing on this for a future NSB meeting, if you wish and we have time on the agenda. I cannot be at the Summer Study, alas.

The State of Knowledge

Historical records document, to varying degrees of certainty, the following salient points:
Probably no single cause can explain all climatic changes. But no theory has a solid theoretical or experimental basis so far.

Key Issues

The key issues for DSBR (and the Nation) to take a look at, in my view, are the following:

1. Severe food shortages are almost inevitable in the decadal time frame on all hypothesis of climate and weather change. These are bound to be politically unsettling. (Ethiopia and India and Bangladesh are examples. Future disasters could be catastrophically severe, and it is possible that 100 million could starve). Some analysts believe Kruschev fell from power in part because of the failure of his dry-land farming policies (including support of Lysenko, whose effect on agriculture was a serious setback). Soil erosion, forest fire damage and other effects of droughts can influence the economy of a region for 15-25 years, as witness the "Dust Bowl" and the Sahel region, to say nothing of the long-term intellectual impact on malnourished children of even two years of deprivation.

2. The US and Canada are slated for further increased roles as the world's food suppliers, with all the favorable and unfavorable social, political, economic and ethical implications that this inevitably will bring. (We'll be increasingly blamed if people starve, I suspect, even though without our food there would be still less.)
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This volume critically examines the investigation of the Bay of Pigs operation conducted by General Maxwell D. Taylor at the behest of President John F. Kennedy during the period from 22 April - 13 June 1961. An almost immediate spate of rumors and leaks were that CIA's blunders were responsible for the "debacle." The relatively recent publication of most of the Taylor Committee's report probably will do little to change that impression among the general public.*

This volume reviews in detail the testimony of the witnesses who appeared before the Committee. It focuses on the errors of fact, the omissions of critical information, the exchanges between witnesses and interrogators, and it assesses the validity of the Committee's findings on the basis of the documentary evidence available at the time of the investigation. The failure of the anti-Castro operation PLUTO would mark the definitive break between the Kennedy and Eisenhower administrations. As a youthful, liberal, and untested Kennedy
5. (TS//NOC//NF) Results: CIA's use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical intelligence on al-Qa'ida. We believe that intelligence acquired from these interrogations has been a key reason why al-Qa'ida has failed to launch a spectacular attack in the West since 11 September 2001. Key intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques:

- **The Karachi Plot:** This plan to conduct attacks against the US Consulate and other US interests in Pakistan was uncovered during the initial interrogations of Khalid Bin Attash and Ammar al-Baluchi and later confirmed by KSM, who provided additional information on the Karachi plot and confirmed al-Qa'ida's collaboration with local Pakistani extremists. KSM provided information on the Karachi plot after we showed him "capture" photos of Ammar and Khalid, and he confirmed al-Qa'ida's collaboration with local Pakistani extremists.

- **The Heathrow Plot:** Initial interrogations of Ammar and Khalid resulted in information on this plot to hijack commercial airliners in Eastern Europe and fly them into Heathrow Airport. Using the information from Khalid and Ammar, we confronted KSM and uncovered details on the plot's evolution and the potential operatives involved. Khalid admitted that he had directed Saudi leader Hazim al-Sha'ir to begin locating pilots for the attack.

- **The "Second Wave":** This was a KSM plot to use East Asian operatives to crash a hijacked airliner into the tallest building on the US West Coast (Los Angeles) as
CONFIDENTIAL/NOFOILM

Below are the descriptions of potential physical and psychological pressures discussed in the July 8, 2002 meeting.

1. Attention Grasp:
In a controlled and quick motion, grasp the individual with both hands, one on each side of the collar opening. In the same motion, draw the individual toward you.

2. Walling: The individual is stood in front of a specially constructed flexible wall. The individual's heels touch the wall. The individual is pulled forward and then quickly and firmly pushed into the wall. The head and neck are supported with a rolled hood or towel that provides a c-collar effect to help prevent whiplash. Contact with the wall is made with the individual's shoulder blades. To reduce the probability of injury, the individual is allowed to rebound from the wall.

3. Facial Hold: One open palm is placed on either side of the individual's face, fingertips well away from the individual's eyes. The goal is to hold the head immobile.

4. Facial Slap (Insult Slap): The slap is delivered with fingers slightly spread. Contact should be made with the area directly between the tip of the chin and the bottom of the corresponding earlobe. The goal of the facial slap is to induce shock and surprise, not severe pain.
Sherman Kent (1903-1986) Yale University History Professor

Worked in OSS and CIA. Considered the father of intelligence analysis. Insisted such analysis must be relevant, rigorous, and insightful.

A founder of *Studies in Intelligence*
The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis Occasional Papers
Volume 1:
No. 1: Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Strategic Warning [PDF Print Version 31KB*]
No. 2: Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Analysts and the Policymaking Process [PDF Print Version 30KB*]
No. 3: Improving CIA Analytic Performance: DI Analytic Priorities [PDF Print Version 29KB*]
No. 4: When everything is intelligence - nothing is intelligence [PDF Print Version 24KB*]
No. 5: Sherman Kent and the Profession of Intelligence Analysis [PDF Print Version 51KB*]

Volume 2:
No. 1: Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis? [PDF Print Version 50KB*]
No. 2: Tensions in Analyst-Policymaker Relations: Opinions, Facts, and Evidence [PDF Print Version 48KB*]
No. 3: Sherman Kent's Final Thoughts on Analyst-Policymaker Relations [PDF Print Version 110KB*]

Volume 3:
No. 1: Making Sense of Transnational Threats [PDF Print Version 154KB*]
No. 2: Rethinking “Alternative Analysis” to Address Transnational Threats [PDF Print Version 82KB*]
Strategic Warning:  
If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis?  

Jack Davis  
Sherman Kent Center

The dramatic events of 11 September 2001 color this paper, but it is not about the devastating terrorist attacks per se, nor about the daunting challenges of tactical warning. The focus, instead, is on strategic warning.

Warning analysis is charged with applying all-source information, expert insights, and specialized tradecraft to help policy officials prevent or limit damage from threats to US security interests. Tactical warning, as defined in this paper, seeks to detect and deter specific threats to US interests; the objective is to avoid incident surprise and thus block or blunt damage. Strategic warning addresses perceived dangers in broader terms, in order to inform policymaker decisions on general security preparedness—again to prevent or limit damage.

US national security resources are limited. Tactical warning cannot be counted on to pinpoint defensive measures by providing timely notice of all specific attacks and menacing developments. In this context, the challenge of strategic warning is to help policy officials decide—in advance of specific indicators of danger—which of the many plausible general threats to US security interests deserve concerted defensive and preemptive preparations.

Strategic warning, to be effective, has to be credible in assessing contingent dangers and has to facilitate policymaker decision and action to protect against these dangers. This paper tables for consideration and debate several recommendations to advance two goals:
7. Encourage Warning Analysts to Engage in Action Analysis

Also to ensure that policy clients take strategic warning seriously, analysts have to be better prepared to address with distinctive intelligence value-added the "so-what" of their assessments. This includes addressing not only the likely implications of a threat to US interests but also, in cost-benefit terms, measures the United States can take to reduce the likelihood and magnitude of potential damage.

Managers and senior analysts regularly join in policymaker efforts to identify and evaluate alternative measures the United States can take to avoid or limit damage from developments that would harm security interests. This form of action or opportunities analysis is usually delivered in oral forums—including telephone exchanges, in-office briefings, teleconferences, and Interagency Working Groups and other decision-oriented meetings. The analyst’s professional role in action analysis is to identify and evaluate; policymakers retain the professional responsibilities to recommend and choose.

All analysts, especially strategic warning analysts, have got to be well trained in the doctrines and skills associated with this professional division of labor—in effect, a replacement for the previously imbedded doctrine that sets a wall of separation between
Center for the Study of Intelligence

- Publishes *Studies in Intelligence*
- Hosts independent research and publishes books and monographs on intelligence topics
- Publish key documentary collections from the Cold War
- Conduct oral history projects
- Produce monographs on CIA history and the history of intelligence
- Support State Department's Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series
CIA Assessments of the Soviet Union: The Record Versus the Charges

An Intelligence Monograph

by Douglas J. MacEachin

"Charges that CIA did not see and report the economic decline, societal deterioration, and political destabilization that ultimately resulted in the breakup of the Soviet Union simply are contradicted by the record."
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What Did CIA Say?

The story that the CIA presented over the decade and a half before the political breakup of the Soviet Union can be broken into three analytic phases. The excerpts in Appendix A are grouped according to these phases.

The Failing System

From the mid-1970s to the eve of Gorbachev’s assumption of party leadership in the spring of 1985, the CIA portrayed a Soviet Union plagued by a deteriorating economy and intensifying societal problems. CIA products described the growing political tensions resulting from these failures, the prospect that sooner or later a Soviet leadership would be forced to confront these issues, and the uncertainty over what form this confrontation would take.

These products include the unclassified testimony from each of DCI Admiral Stansfield Turner’s annual appearances before the JEC from 1977 through 1980 (Appendix A, references 5 and 6). Other unclassified CIA publications disseminated in 1977 and 1980 (Appendix A, references 5 and 6) presented the same picture of a deteriorating economy that ultimately could provoke more radical policies.

From the late 1970s through the early 1980s, CIA produced several papers addressing the prospects for “serious economic and political problems” arising from the combined effect of growing consumer discontent, ethnic divisions, a corrupt and incompetent political system, and widespread cynicism among a populace for whom the system had failed to deliver on its promises (Appendix A, references 7 and 8 and 10-13). One of these, for example, described the problems stemming from “long continued neglect” of the economy that “resulted in shortages of staple goods and widespread salary arrears” that were likely to lead to popular dissatisfaction and political unrest. CIA analysts referred to a “political vacuum” (possibly even an initial successor) was nonetheless likely to attempt to muddle through rather than confront the politically difficult choices necessary to deal with the decline; that muddling through was not a viable option for the longer term; and that by the mid-1980s the economic picture “might look so dismal” that a post-Brezhnev leadership might coalesce behind policies that could include “structural reforms.”
DCI Exceptional Intelligence Analyst Program
An Intelligence Monograph

International Trafficking in Women to the United States: A Contemporary Manifestation of Slavery and Organized Crime

by Amy O’Neill Richard

Date of Information: November 1999
III. Enticement and Deception

Traffickers typically lure women to the United States with false promises of jobs as waitresses, nannies, models, factory workers, or exotic dancers. Capitalizing on rising unemployment, disintegrating social networks, and the low status of women in the source countries, the traffickers promise high wages and good working conditions in exciting US cities. Traffickers recruit women abroad through advertisements and employment, travel, model, or matchmaking agencies. Many women fall victim when they apply for work at seemingly reputable employment agencies which are unlicensed or unregulated. Recruiters may also target beauty contest winners and entice them with “work offers.” Additionally, traffickers send recruiters to villages and towns. In other instances, friends and acquaintances recruit women informally, through word of mouth. In almost all the cases, recruiters or agents front the money for provision of travel documents, transportation, and supposed jobs. Occasionally, bogus contracts are used to provide an image of legitimacy, lulling the woman into believing she is dealing with a reputable business. The Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW) reports that the Internet is the latest place for promoting global trafficking of women and children as it is being used to lure women to foreign cities with false promises.

Once recruited, the women usually find themselves in situations with severely curtailed freedoms. The women’s passports or travel documents are taken, their movements are restricted, and their wages are withheld until their smuggling debt is repaid. And because traffickers can also re-sell the women’s debts to other traffickers or employers, victims are often caught in a cycle of perpetual debt bondage. Women are prevented from leaving by security guards, violence, threats, debt bondage, and/or retention of their documents. The traffickers may maintain control through isolation; in many cases, the women must live and work at the location. The women may also be denied outside medical assistance when needed. Threats of physical abuse against themselves and/or their families are also common in order to force cooperation. Traffickers also play upon the women’s fears of arrest and deportation. In additional cases, trafficking victims suffer extreme physical and mental abuse, including rape, imprisonment, forced abortions, and physical brutality.
THE "FIRST CALLERS"

THE PRESIDENT’S DAILY BRIEF (PDB) ACROSS THREE ADMINISTRATIONS

Intelligence and Policy
September 2013
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Briefing the President: George W. Bush

Two events during the presidency of George W. Bush resulted in significant change in the PDB production process—the creation of the office of the director of national intelligence (ODNI) at the end of 2004, and the beginning of what came to be called “deep dives”—deeper looks at particular issues—in the latter part of the second term. Together, these changes made the PDB process somewhat more cumbersome and the clearance process more involved as a larger number of agencies contributed content and advance scheduling became more of a necessity. In the end, though, most of the content continued to be contributed by CIA. Like Clinton, George W. Bush entered office having had little exposure to intelligence products and without established preferences or routines for receiving them. How he used the PDB thus evolved a good deal over his two terms in office. Then-Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence Michael Hayden’s comments nicely summarize the change in Bush 43’s intelligence savvy over time:

In the first term, most people were very happy that he had…surrounded himself with what was thought to be the “A Team”—Condoleezza Rice, Secretary Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, and so on. It was my observation in the second term that the president—and I don’t mean this to criticize his advisers—but that the president had grown past his advisers in his understanding of things.\(^{15}\)

Hayden attributes this development in no small measure to the PDB, an attribution that seems on the mark. During the Bush 43 presidency, the PDB process—what was provided to the president and how it was used—all evolved over time. As a result, the PDB became less the “snapshots” lamented by Berger and more of a content-driven discussion between policymakers and intelligence analysts, including a series of conversations—the “deep dives.” Bush 43 established a close working relationship with CIA early on, apparently in large measure because of his quick and easy rapport with DCI George Tenet, a marked contrast to the relationship between Clinton and his three DCIs, especially Woolsey. Tenet would meet with Bush 43 several times each week and often would be present at the daily briefings.\(^{46}\) These briefings were also regularly attended by Vice President Cheney, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card, Jr., who counted among the small group of a half dozen advisers who received the PDB.\(^{47}\)

The first set of changes was driven not by the president and his preferences but rather by the aftereffects of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. First, in the spring of 2004, the contents and use of the PDB came under public scrutiny as a result of Rice’s testimony before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, popularly called the “9/11 Commission,” which was charged with providing a “full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the attacks.” One partic-
CIA Museum

Inform, Instruct, Inspire

The CIA Museum supports the Agency's operational, recruitment and training missions and helps visitors better understand CIA and its contributions to national security.

- The Museum's staff works with Presidential libraries and other major museums and institutions for display in public exhibitions.
- These collaborations help promote a wider understanding of the craft of intelligence and its role in the American experience.

History of the Museum

In 1972, William E. Colby, then the Executive Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, suggested the creation of an Agency museum. He directed the Agency's components and its Fine Arts Commission to identify items of historical significance to create "a very selective accumulation of truly unique items."
Eloise Page began her intelligence career in 1942 as a secretary to OSS chief William Donovan. A Virginia native, she transferred to the newly formed CIA in 1947 and rose steadily through its ranks—while never giving up her Southern drawl or ladylike white gloves. Page became the CIA’s first female chief of a flagship station and, as a senior executive, the first female head of a major component of the Intelligence Community.
The Well Dressed Spy ... Bodyworn Surveillance Equipment

Details

Q: What is the most remarkable feature of an intelligence officer’s appearance?

A: Nothing at all. They are inconspicuous.

Their clothing, accessories, and behavior must be as unremarkable as possible — their lives (and the lives of others) may depend on it. This is a responsibility that operational artisans, technicians, and engineers of the Office of Technical Readiness (OTR) take seriously. America’s intelligence organizations must always be able to blend in.
DCI Allen W. Dulles’s Stamps

Details

Former OSS officer Allen W. Dulles was the longest serving DCI from 1953 to 1961. To many, this period was the “Golden Age” of the CIA, for it was under Dulles that the Agency matured and developed its characteristic style. These two well-worn stamps were his—one when he was partner in a prestigious New York law firm and the other simply his name.

8 cm x 6 cm x 2.5 cm (large)

Further Reading

Videos
Microdot Camera

The secret transfer of documents became very difficult during the Cold War. Agents relied on the microdot camera to photograph and reduce whole pages of information onto a single tiny piece of film. This piece of film could be embedded into the text of a letter as small as the period at the end of this sentence.

Microdots were also hidden in other things such as rings, hollow coins, or other mailed items. The recipient would read the microdot with the aid of a special viewer, often cleverly concealed as well.

1.6 cm x 2.8 cm
Afghan Saddle

Details

Joint CIA and US Military Special Forces teams inserted into Afghanistan found the local terrain challenging. The joint US teams and their Afghan military allies found local transportation networks offered opportunities American forces had not enjoyed in over a century: cavalry charges. But these were commonplace in the campaign. A CIA communications officer obtained this saddle for the CIA Museum with the assistance of an Afghan colleague who was killed a month later.

Further Reading

Related Stories
• Gain greater understanding of this agency’s multifaceted activities.
• Learn about its historical successes and failures through its voluminous documentary record.
• Learn how the agency viewed national, international, and transnational issues during its seven decade history.
• Study and analyze the individuals and organizations carrying out U.S. intelligence operations and analysis.

• Study and analyze the acute moral dilemmas facing the CIA and how the agency addressed these topics.
• Learn about CIA personnel and policymaker interaction with other U.S. government agencies, including Congress, and with foreign counterpart and adversarial intelligence agencies.
• Gain appreciation for the multidisciplinary variety of topics CIA personnel work on through their operations and analysis.
ANY QUESTIONS?